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INTRODUCTION 
The STS-73 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report summarizes the Payload 
activities as well as the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), 
Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM}, and the Space Shuttle main engine 
(SSME) systems performance during the seventy-second flight of the Space 
Shuttle Program, the forty-seventh flight since the return-to-flight, and the 
eighteenth flight of the Orbiter Columbia (OV-1 02). STS-73 was also the first 
flight of OV-102 following the vehicle's return from the Orbiter Maintenance 
Down Period (OMDP). In addition to the Orbiter, the flight vehicle consisted of 
an ET that was designated ET -73; three SSMEs that were designated as serial 
numbers 2037 (Block I}, 2031 (PH-1), and 2038 (Block 1) in positions 1, 2, and 
3, respectively; and two SRBs that were designated Bl-075. The RSRMs, 
designated RSRM-50, were installed in each SRB and the individual RSRMs 
were designated as 360L050A for the left SRB, and 360W050B for the right 
SRB. 
The STS-73 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report fulfills the Space Shuttle 
Program requirement as documented in NSTS 07700, Volume VII, Appendix E. 
The requirement stated in that document is that each organizational element 
supporting the Program will report the results of their hardware (and software) 
evaluation and mission performance plus identify all related in-flight anomali~s. 
• The primary objective of this flight was to successfully perform the planned 
operations of the United States Microgravity Laboratory (USML) -2 payload. The 
USML-2 consisted of the following major experiments payloads: 
• 
a. Three-Dimensional Microgravity Accelerometer (3-DMA); 
b. Astroculture (ASC); 
c. Commercial Generic Bioprocessing Apparatus (CGBA); 
d. Commercial Protein Crystal Growth (CPCG); 
e. Crystal Growth Furnace (CGF); 
f. Drop Physics Module (DPM); 
g. Geophysical Fluid Flow Cell (GFFC); 
h. Glovebox Experiments (GBX); 
I. Single-Locker Protein Crystal Growth (SPCG); 
j. Space Acceleration Measurement System (SAMS); 
k. Surface Tension Driven Convection Experiment (STDCE); 
I. Zeolite Crystal Growth (ZCG); 
m. Advanced Protein Crystallization Facility (APCF); and 
n. High-Packed Digital Television (HIPAC). 
The secondary objective of this flight was to complete the operations of the 
Orbital Acceleration Research Experiment (OARE) . 
1 
The STS-73 mission was planned as a 16-day flight plus 2 contingency days, 
which were available for weather avoidance or Orbiter contingency operations. • 
The sequence of events for the STS-73 mission is shown in Table I, and the 
Orbiter Project Office Problem Tracking List is shown in Table II. The 
Government Furnished Equipment/Flight Crew Equipment (GFEIFCE) Problem 
Tracking List is shown in Table Ill. Appendix A lists the sources of data, both 
formal and informal, that were used to prepare thi$ report. Appendix B provides 
the definition of acronyms and abbreviations used throughout the report. All 
times during the flight are given in Greenwich mean time (G.m.t.) and mission 
elapsed time (MET). 
The seven-person crew for STS-73 consisted of Kenneth D. Bowersox, CDR., 
U.S. Navy, Commander; Kent V. Rominger, CDR., U.S. Navy, Pilot; Kathryn C. 
Thornton, Civilian, PhD., Payload Commander and Mission Specialist 3; 
Catherine G. Coleman, Capt., U. S. Air Force, Ph.D, Mission Specialist 1; 
Michael E. Lopez-Aiegria, Lt. Cdr., U.S. Navy, Mission Specialist 2; Fred W. 
Leslie, Ph.D., Civilian, Payload Specialist 1; and Albert Sacco, Jr., Ph.D., 
Civilian, Payload Specialist 2. STS-73 was the fourth flight for the Payload 
Commander/Mission Specialist 3; the third space flight for the Commander; and 
the first space flight for the Pilot, Mission Specialist 1, Mission Specialist 2, and 
Payload Specialists 1 and 2. 
2 
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MISSION SUMMARY 
The first attempt to launch the STS-73 mission occurred on September 28, 1995; 
however, shortly after propellant loading of the External Tank (ET) began, a 
hydrogen leak through the Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) 1 main fuel valve 
was noted. As a result, the launch was scrubbed so that the main fuel valve 
could be replaced. The launch was rescheduled for October 5, 1995, but the 
weather effects from Hurricane Opal resulted in a decision at the L-1 briefing to 
delay the launch until Friday, October 6. The October 6 launch attempt was 
scrubbed prior to ET loading when it was determined that hydraulic fluid had 
been inadvertently drained from hydraulic system 1 following the SSME 1 main 
fuel valve replacement. A compressibility test of the system was performed and 
it showed that the system was satisfactory for launch, and the launch was 
rescheduled for October 7. The launch on October 7 was scrubbed when 
master events controller 1 (MEC 1) built-in test equipment (BITE) indicated that 
the MEC 1 core B critical drivers were not enabled. MEC 1 was replaced and 
satisfactorily retested, and the launch was rescheduled for October 14, 1995. 
The launch on October 14 was rescheduled to October 15 to allow additional 
time to inspect the main engine oxidizer ducts as a result of finding a crack in a 
test engine oxidizer duct. No anomalous conditions were found. Also during 
this delay, multiplexer/demultiplexer (MOM) flight aft (FA) 1 was bypassed. Data 
were reviewed, troubleshooting of the data bus was performed, and general 
purpose computer (GPC) 1 was replaced and successfully retested. 
Early on the morning of October 15, the time of launch was delayed one hour to 
10:46 a.m. e.d.t. (9:46a.m. c.d.t.) because weather conditions were predicted to 
be unacceptable at the planned time; however, the conditions did not improve 
and the launch was tentatively rescheduled to Thursday, October 19, 1995, 
based on the launch of an Atlas on Tuesday, October 18. The Atlas launch was 
delayed and the STS-73 launch was rescheduled to Friday, October 20, 1995. 
The STS-73 vehicle was successfully launched on October 20, 1995, at 
293:13:53:00.013 G.m.t. The Orbiter was inserted into a nominal 150-nmi. 
circular orbit on an inclination of 39 degrees after a satisfactory launch phase. 
Total vehicle weight at liftoff was 4,521 ,5391b of which the Orbiter constituted 
257,3271b. 
During ascent, water spray boiler (WSB) 3 experienced a freeze-up as 
evidenced by the auxiliary power unit (APU) 3 lubrication oil return temperature 
increasing above the normal spray-start temperature of 250 °F. When the 
temperature reached 290 °F, the crew was requested to switch from controller A 
to controller B on system 3. However, the boiler was apparently shut off instead, 
and when the temperature reached 310 °F, the crew was requested to turn the 
WSB power back on and switch to controller B. After switching controllers, the 
• temperature rise rate did not change, indicating a spray bar freeze-up. When 
3 
the temperature reached 326 °F, the crew was directed to shut down APU 3 
earlier than planned. Approximately one minute later, WSB 3 (on controller B) • 
began spraying, indicating that the spray bar had thawed. All three WSBs have 
the heater modification that was implemented to preclude WSB freeze-ups. This 
heater modification was also flown on STS-69/0V-105 on WSB 3. 
All SSME and RSRM start sequences occurred as expected and launch phase 
performance was satisfactory in all respects. First stage ascent performance 
was as expected. SRB separation, entry, deceleration, and water impact 
occurred as anticipated. Both SRBs were successfully recovered and retumed 
to Kennedy Space Center (KSC) for disassembly and refurbishment. 
Performance of the SSMEs, ET and main propulsion system (MPS) was normal. 
When closing the Orbiter/ET doors following ET separation, AC 1 phase B 
current did not power the four motors normally supported by this circuit. Further 
data review showed that the left vent doors 8/9 motor 1 had also lost AC 1 phase 
B current when the doors were opened prior to launch. This loss caused these 
motors to operate on two phases, a condition for which the motors are certified. 
AC1 phase B current was not present during any of the vent door 8/9 
repositioning during the remainder of the mission or during the ET door opening 
postlanding. Data evaluation indicates that the most probable cause of the 
failure was an open circuit of phase B between circuit breaker (CB) 4 on panel 
MA73C and aft motor controller assembly (AMCA) 1. Believing that oxidation of • 
the circuit breaker contact was a likely cause of the problem, CB 4 on panel 
MA73C was cycled during postlanding operations, and the AC1 phase B current 
returned. 
The orbital maneuvering subsystem (OMS) 2 maneuver was performed at 
293:14:34:28.7 G.m.t. (000:00:41 :28.7 MET). The two-engine firing was 
118.9 seconds in duration and imparted a AV of 186 ft/sec. The OMS performed 
satisfactorily throughout the firing. 
Opening of the payload bay doors was completed at 293:15:28:36 G.m.t. 
(00:01 :35:36 MET). The port payload bay door was positioned to the 62-degree 
open position instead of fully open. This position was used to minimize the 
chance of micrometeorite/orbital debris (M/OD) impacts on the port radiator, 
since the predominant attitude flown during the mission would have exposed the 
port radiator to a higher-than-normal M/OD flux. 
The first reaction control subsystem (RCS) trim firing was initiated at 
293:16:54:40 G.m.t. (000:03:01 :40 MET). It was a 30-second -X maneuver 
which imparted a AV of 6.9 ft/sec. Thruster F1 F failed off 320 ms after initiation 
of the firing because the chamber pressure (Pc) reached only 17 psia. All other 
thruster firings during the trim maneuver were nominal. The F1 F thruster 
temperature decrease indicated that both propellant valves achieved at least • 
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• 
• 
• 
pilot-valve flow. The Pc subsequently required about 15 minutes to return to 
zero psia. The fact that the Pc decreased so slowly indicates that the thruster 
fail-off condition was caused by a blockage of the Pc-tube orifice. This Pc tube 
was last flushed during the STS-73 processing flow. The Pc tube was inspected 
on the vehicle for blockage and none was found. However, the problem does 
appear to be within the F1 F pressure-sensing system. The thruster was 
removed and replaced. 
The flash evaporator system (FES) feed line A mid 2 temperature measurement 
slowly decreased beginning at approximately 293:19:53 G.m.t. (00:05:30 MET}, 
and the heater did not cycle. Based on previous flight data, a heater cycle would 
have been expected at approximately 70 °F. When the temperature reached 
54.7 °F at approximately 296:17:16 G.m.t. (003:03:23 MET), the FES feedline A 
mid 2 heater system 1 was declared failed off. The FES feedline A mid 2 heater 
system 2 was activated and cycled nominally for the remainder of the mission. 
Postflight troubleshooting isolated the problem to a broken wire at a ground Jug. 
A repair was made. 
Occurrences of S-band forward-link dropouts were observed while transmitting 
on the lower right antenna. An examination of data from 20 orbits indicated that 
there were no noticeable differences between transmissions on the high and low 
frequencies, and that the dropouts were on both Tracking and Data Relay 
Satellites (TDRSs). Troubleshooting and testing were performed later in the 
mission to further define the S-band lower-right-antenna degraded performance 
problem. The troubleshooting and testing activity appear to have isolated the 
problem to the path between the lower-right antenna and the antenna switch. 
The problem was repeated intermittently during ground testing. The lower 
right-hand antenna was removed and replaced; however, dropouts were still 
received during transmit/receive tests. 
At approximately 298:13:43 G.m.t. (004:23:50 MET}, the port payload bay door 
was taken to the full-open position in support of the mission's only Spacelab 
condensate dump. The door was moved to the 52-degree open position 
following the dump at approximately 298:14:20 G.m.t. (005:00:27 MET). Door 
operation was nominal. Video of the door centerline was taken before and after 
repositioning. The video was reviewed, and no anomalous conditions were 
found. 
Vernier RCS thrusters R5R and R5D failed to fire when commanded at 
300:18:04 G.m.t. (007:04:11 MET). Data show that the fire command B was 
issued for one sample to both thrusters, but no driver output or Pc was indicated 
for either thruster. Since Pc was not present, the redundancy management (RM) 
software deselected both thrusters. Because no indication of a thruster failure 
was present, both the R5D and R5R thrusters were hot-fired and each provided 
a good one-second pulse. The two vernier thrusters were then reselected for 
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flight use. During the course of the mission, the same two vernier thrusters 
failed off seven additional times and two primary thrusters (L3D and R3D) failed • 
off once. The failure signature was similar in all of the occurrences. A similar 
failure of thruster R5D occurred during the previous flight of this vehicle 
(STS-65), and troubleshooting failed to indicate the cause. This appears to be a 
problem in the command path. The MOM (SIN 121) and the reaction jet driver 
(RJD) (S/N 20) in the command path to the R5D and R5R vernier thrusters as 
well as the aft manifold 3 primary thrusters are the same units flown on STS-65. 
Extensive troubleshooting has failed to recreate the anomaly. The MOM and the 
RJD in the command path have been removed and replaced. 
At approximately 300:07:18 G.m.t. (06:17:25 MET), the crew reported a small 
impact crater on window W2. The crew estimated the size of the crater to be 
approximately 1 mm in diameter. The crater was located near the edge of the 
window closest the vehicle centerline. Camcorder video and electronic still 
camera images of the impact site were analyzed, and the assessment of the 
damage indicated that the crater was not a concern for the mission. 
At 302:04:27 G.m.t. (008:14:34 MET), the Orbiter was maneuvered to a 
bottom-Sun attitude for thermal conditioning of the left main landing gear (MLG) 
tire. As expected, the port MLG tires were cooling off, and therefore, their 
pressure was dropping as a result of the vehicle attitude and the port payload 
door position. Prior to the maneuver, the port payload bay door was fully 
opened to maximize the warming effect of the bottom-Sun attitude. This attitude 
was maintained until302:12:27 G.m.t. (008:22:34 MET). During the maneuver 
back to the biased -XLV -YVV attitude, the port payload bay door was moved 
back to the 52-degree open position. The data from this period of thermal 
conditioning were used to update tire-temperature predictions for the remainder 
of the mission and to determine end-of-mission conditioning requirements. 
At 304:05:11:00 G.m.t. (010:15:18 MET), the Orbiter was maneuvered to a 
bottom-Sun attitude for the second thermal conditioning period of the port MLG 
tires. Prior to the maneuver, the port payload bay door was again fully opened 
to maximize the warming effect of the bottom-Sun attitude. The vehicle 
remained in the bottom-Sun attitude until304:19:01 :33 G.m.t. 
(011 :05:08:33 MET), and was then maneuvered back to a biased -XLV -YVV 
attitude. The port payload bay door was returned to the 52-degree open position. 
• 
At 304:21 :48 G.m.t. (011 :07:55 MET), the FES experienced an 
under-temperature shutdown. The shutdown was caused by operating the 
topping evaporator at a heat load that was higher than its design-specified 
capability (reference Shuttle Operational Data Book). Contributing factors to this 
heat load included Beta angle, vehicle attitude, and lower port-radiator efficiency 
due to the 52-degree-open port-door position. The primary controller A was 
reset, and FES operation was restored. Nine additional FES shutdowns • 
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occurred during the next 24 hours. As a result, the decision was made to leave 
the port payload bay door fully open following the third thermal conditioning 
period for the port MLG tires that was initiated at 306:08:23 G.m.t. 
(012:18:30 MET). With the door fully open, no additional FES under-
temperature shut downs occurred during the mission, and there were no further 
thermal issues with the attitude timeline for the remainder of the mission. 
At 308:08:55 G.m.t. (014:19:02 MET}, the crew reported that cathode ray tube 
(CRT) 2 was flashing on and off and that the symbols on the screen were 
garbled. These symptoms were intermittent, and the data indicated a problem 
with the CRT. As a result, an in-flight maintenance (IFM) procedure to switch 
positions of CRT 2 and CRT 4 was performed, and the CRT in position 2 
performed satisfactorily for the remainder of the ·mission. The failed CRT was 
not repowered for the remainder of the mission. 
At 308:09:16 G.m.t. (014:19:23 MET), an RCS vernier thruster plume 
impingement test was performed. The purpose of the test was to obtain 
acceleration data to better understand the plume impingement effects of the aft 
vernier down-firing thrusters on the wings and body flap as first noted during 
STS-71 operations while docked with the Mir. The 20-second pitch-pulse test of 
vernier thrusters LSD and R5D was performed satisfactorily, followed by a 
20-second single-thruster firing of LSD, which was also satisfactory. 
• The flight control system (FCS) checkout began with APU 3 being started at 
308:09:35:29.878 G.m.t. (014:19:42:29.885 MET}, and APU 3 ran for 
• 
12 minutes and 18.372 seconds. A total of 27 Ibm of APU fuel was used during 
the FCS checkout. Data review indicates that the FCS, APU, and hydraulic 
subsystems performed nominally. The APU run-time was lengthened to check 
out the WSB 3 controllers as a result of the ascent cooling anomaly. The 
maximum lubrication oil return temperature reached with WSB 3 controller A was 
273 °F. This is within the specification of no greater than 275 oF for start-of-
spray cooling. An over-cooling condition to 236 °F followed before the steady-
state temperature of 252 oF was reached. Spray cooling was observed for about 
2.5 minutes before switching to the WSB 3 controller B as planned. Nominal 
steady-state cooling was observed on the WSB 3 controller B. 
At 308:10:38 G.m.t. (014:20:45 MET}, the RCS primary thruster hot-fire test was 
initiated. The procedure was performed twice, and no thruster failures were 
noted. 
The hydrogen and oxygen manifold isolation valves were being cycled for the 
in-flight checkout, and the hydrogen manifold 1 isolation valve, which had been 
open, failed to close when commanded at 308:13:42 G.m.t. (014:23:49 MET). 
Four minutes later, the switch was held in the CLOSE position for 10 seconds, 
7 
but the valve position again did not change. Manifold pressure data confirmed 
that the valve was still open. This failure did not impact the mission. 
All entry stowage and deorbit preparations were completed in preparation for the 
nominal end-of-mission landing day. The Ku-band antenna was stowed at 
308:23:05 G.m.t. (015:09:12 MET). The payload bay doors were successfully 
closed and latched at 309:08:15 G.m.t. (015:18:22 MET). The deorbit maneuver 
was performed on orbit 255 at 309:10:46:40 G.m.t. (015:20:53:40 MET) for a 
KSC Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) landing, and the maneuver was 
162.5 seconds in duration with a llV of 270ft/sec. Entry interface (400,000 ft) 
occurred at 309:11:13:19 G.m.t. (015:21 :20:19 MET). 
Entry was completed satisfactorily, and main landing gear touchdown occurred 
on SLF concrete runway 33 at 309:11 :45:21.4 G.m.t. (015:21 :52:21.4 MET) on 
November 5, 1995. The Orbiter drag chute was deployed at 309:11 :45:29 G.m.t. 
and the nose gear touchdown occurred 6.4 seconds later. The drag chute was 
jettisoned at 309:11:45:58 G.m.t. with wheels stop occurring at 
309:11:46:16 G.m.t. The rollout was normal in all respects. The flight duration 
was 15 days 21 hours 52 minutes and 21 seconds. The vehicle weight at 
landing was 230,416 lb. The APUs were shut down 18 minutes 46.5 seconds 
after landing. 
• 
Postlanding, a decay was noted in the APU 1 fuel pump inlet pressure. The • 
pressure dropped from 150 psia to 35 psia during a 20-minute period (Flight 
Problem STS-73-V-09). The fuel pump seal cavity drain line pressure rose from 
20.5 to 22.0 psia during the same period. Data review revealed that a slower 
decay was experienced after the prelaunch hot-fire of the APU and following the 
on-orbit APU shutdown. The signature indicates possible leakage of fuel past 
the fuel pump seal into the seal cavity. Postflight inspection and testing found 
approximately 1 08 cc of fuel in the APU 1 catch bottle. The decision was made 
to remove and replace the APU. 
• 
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PAYLOADS 
STS-73 was the second United States Microgravity Laboratory (USML-2) 
Spacelab mission, and it scientific success was building on the foundation of the 
first USML (-1) mission, which flew in 1992 (STS-50). USML data were gathered 
in five major scientific areas during the STS-73 mission. These areas were: 
a. Fluid physics; 
b. Materials science; 
c. Biotechnology; 
d. Combustion science; and 
e. Commercial space processing technologies. 
The experiments were housed in a 23-foot Spacelab module inside the payload 
bay as well as in the middeck of the Orbiter. 
This mission was the longest microgravity Spacelab mission. The payload was 
comprised of 14 experiments, seven investigations, one demonstration, and one 
evaluation. Over 60 Tera (60 X 1012) bits of real-time scientific data were 
processed during the mission, and this is three times more than any previous 
mission. More than 750 video tapes were recorded and over 300 electronic still 
camera high-resolution images were processed. Over 1500 protein samples 
were processed in three Protein Crystal Growth experiments. 
ASTROCULTURE 
The Astroculture (ASC) experiment met its objectives by demonstrating the 
capability of the ASC plant growth facility to provide the conditions required to 
conduct plant science research in the space environment. The viability of the 
facility was satisfactorily demonstrated by the growing of five small potatoes from 
tubers. This experiment contributed to the study of growing edible foods in 
space. Near the end of the mission, the leaves began to yellow and deteriorate, 
an expected event that led investigators to believe the tiny potatoes were 
drawing photosynthetic energy from the leaves. The potato tubers continued to 
grow through the end of the mission until they were preserved postflight. 
SURFACE TENSION DRIVEN CONVECTION EXPERIMENT 
The Surface Tension Driven Convection Experiment (STDCE) enabled 
researchers to view in great detail the basic fluid mechanics and heat transfer of 
thermocapillary flows. The STDCE measured the transition from steady, 
two-dimensional flows to oscillatory, or three-dimensional, flows using silicone 
oil. 
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The STDCE gathered extensive data on the instability of fluid flows caused by 
variations in surface temperatures. A total of 49 tests were conducted and that • 
was six more than planned. Except in very tiny containers such as capillary 
tubes, such oscillations have not been observed on Earth. Varied conditions 
such as chamber size and proportions, surface shape (cannot be varied on 
Earth) and heat location and intensity were applied to the silicone fluid surface. 
Using the downlink video enabled the scientists to clearly pinpoint when the fluid 
flows transition from stable to oscillatory (unstable) flows. Also, the scientists 
found that when the temperature was increased past the point where oscillations 
began, the flows became erratic. These data will be used to form a fluid physics 
data base for improved materials processing. 
DROP PHYSICS MODULE 
The Drop Physics Module (DPM) manipulated free-floating liquid drops in micro-
gravity to expand the current fluid physics models and theories and to measure 
the properties of liquid surfaces. The rectangular experiment chamber where 
liquid samples were deployed had four loudspeaker drivers which were used to 
position the water drops in the chamber. 
The experiment successfully achieved major steps toward drop encapsulation in 
the DPM, a facility that used sound waves to levitate and manipulate liquid drops 
for close study. Several more firsts were achieved and one of these was the • 
forming of compound drops. The injecting of one drop into another led to 
successful coalescence--two drops being deployed separately and coming 
together to become one. Another first was the formation of a chemical 
membrane that was formed when two drops were deployed and coalesced and 
formed one drop. Drop fissioning, where one drop was spun until it broke into 
two drops, also was achieved. Another study that evaluated the surface-altering 
chemical influences was successful, providing scientists with a wealth of data on 
different surface behaviors when water drops with subfactants were oscillated 
using the sound waves. 
Drop Dynamics Experiment 
The Drop Dynamics Experiment (DOE) gathered high quality data on the 
dynamics of liquid drops in low gravity for comparison with theoretical 
predictions and ground-based studies. The experiment investigated fluid 
physics and chemical interactions involved with centering one liquid drop inside 
another, and the results will apply to cell encapsulation research. 
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Science and Technology of Surface-Controlled Phenomena 
The Science and Technology of Surface-Controlled Phenomena examined the 
influence of surfactants on the behavior of drops, and the manner in which the 
surfactants altered the surface properties of a liquid. 
GEOPHYSICAL FLUID FLOW CELL EXPERIMENT 
The Geophysical Fluid Flow Cell (GFFC) Experiment gathered data on the 
movement of fluids in a microgravity. Results of this experiment from the 
STS-51 B Spacelab 3 mission revealed new types of convection. This STS-73 
experiment expanded on that knowledge. 
The experiment ran for 150 hours, modeling 29 different scenarios of fluid flows 
in oceans, atmospheres, planets, and stars. The simulations studied how fluids 
move in microgravity. Several of the scenarios simulated the atmosphere of the 
planet Jupiter. Some experiment runs seemed to validate predictions in a 
mathematical model of planetary and solar fluid flows. One simulation showed 
an atmospheric flow predicted by a computer model that previously had not been 
validated . 
CRYSTAL GROWTH FURNACE 
The Crystal Growth Furnace (CGF) was a reusable Spacelab facility that was 
used for growing crystals of semiconducting materials, metals and alloys. This 
furnace, which had it debut on USML-1, is the first space furnace developed by 
the United States for processing multiple large samples at very high 
temperatures (above 1,832 °F). On this mission, four primary crystal growth 
experiments were flown as a continuation of the experiments from USML-1 . 
This experiment grew crystals as a liquid bridge for the first time, thus minimizing 
contact with the container wall and decreasing the number of defects in the 
crystal. A total of eight semiconductor crystals were successfully grown in the 
crystal growth furnace. The furnace was also used to grow gallium arsenide 
crystals, which are faster and require less power than traditional silicon crystals, 
that will be used for study of how tiny traces of intentionally added impurities 
enhanced electrical properties. 
Orbital Processing of High Quality Cadmium Zinc Telluride Compound 
Semiconductors 
This experiment provided data as well as a crystal from which the effects of 
gravity on the growth and quality of the alloyed compound semiconductor were 
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evaluated. Evaluation of the crystal showed the effects of gravity in causing 
structural defects in the crystal. 
Study of Dopant Segregation Behavior During the Crvstal Growth of 
Gallium Arsenide in Microgravity 
This experiment provided data on techniques of uniformly distributing a small 
amount of selenium, a dopant, within a gallium arsenide crystal to improve and 
precisely control the electronic characteristics of the crystal. Growing the 
crystals is space greatly reduces the gravitational influences that cause an 
uneven distribution of the dopants in crystals grown on Earth, as well as allowing 
the identification of more subtle influences on the distribution. 
The furnace was also used to grow gallium arsenide crystals, which are faster 
and require less power than traditional silicon crystals, that will be used for study 
of how tiny traces of intentionally added impurities enhanced electrical 
properties. 
Crystal Growth of Selected II-VI Semiconducting Alloys by Directional 
Solidification 
This experiment provided data for the confirmation of how gravity influences the 
• 
introduction and distribution of structural defects in alloy semiconductors during • 
crystal growth. One crystal of mercury zinc telluride, about 3/4 inch in length, 
was grown, and it will be analyzed postflight to determine its chemical and 
physical properties. 
Vapor Transport Crystal Growth of Mercury Cadmium Telluride in 
Microgravity 
This experiment built on the success of the USML-1 mission and focused on the 
initial phase of vapor crystal growth in a complex alloy semiconductor. One 
crystal was grown that consisted of a layer of mercury cadmium telluride on a 
cadmium telluride substrate (base). This crystal was analyzed to determine the 
effects of microgravity on the growth rate, chemical composition, structural 
characteristics and other properties of the initial crystalline layer that formed on 
the substrate. 
Mercury Cadmium Tellluride, an infrared detecting material, was used to study 
the initial crystal layer formation. On the first USML mission, the first layer had 
significantly fewer defects (1 000 times more defect free) than ground-based 
crystals. 
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ZEOLITE CRYSTAL GROWTH FURNACE 
The Zeolite Crystal Growth (ZCG) Furnace was used to process 38 Zeolite 
samples during the course of the mission. The scientists believe that analyzing 
the crystals will provide a better understanding of the three-dimensional 
structure of the crystals, as well as techniques for creating large, near-perfect 
Zeolite crystals in microgravity. This experiment was also flown on USML-1. 
Data were obtained from the downlink video which indicated a uniform 
population of suspended particles throughout the samples in which growth was 
expected. Ground-control samples were unlike the space-grown samples in 
that the particles had settled. 
GLOVEBOX FACILITY 
The Spacelab Glovebox Facility, developed by the European Space Agency, 
provided a versatile, transparent enclosure for testing and developing 
procedures and technologies in microgravity. The Glovebox Facility was flown 
on USML-1 , but it was improved by increasing the working area and the 
lighting. Seven experiments made use of the facility during the STS-73 mission. 
Interface Configuration Experiment 
This experiment provided data on the shapes of fluid surfaces when contained in 
specific containers in microgravity. The behavior of free liquid-vapor interfaces 
cannot be predicted satisfactorily at this time, and the scientists believe that this 
experiment will resolve some the questions that exist on the subject. This 
experiment was flown on USML-1. 
Scientists were able to see definite differences in the way fluids adhered to 
chamber walls in the experiment's various containers, and some of the behavior 
was different from that predicted by classic mathematics models. The new 
insights will aid in the design of fluid systems for space such as those for fuels. 
Oscillatory Thermocapillary Flow Experiment 
This experiment complements the Surface Tension Driven Convection 
Experiment. Data were taken at the onset of oscillations, or periodic variations, 
in surface-temperature-induced fluid flows. 
Fiber Supported Droplet Combustion 
This experiment provided data on combustion of droplets of fuel in microgravity. 
Drops normally burn unevenly in 1-g, but in microgravity it was expected that the 
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drops would assume a symmetric sphere shape, and thus burn more evenly, 
thereby easing the process of validating combustion theories. 
More than 25 droplets of a variety of fuels were ignited while suspended on a 
ceramic wire tether in the fiber-supported droplet combustion (FSDC) 
experiment. This experiment, which was flown for the first time, confirmed 
theories about how fuels burn in microgravity. The individual experiments 
resulted in larger droplet extension diameters (size of drop as it burns out) than 
any initial droplet size capable of being studied on Earth. The burning time was 
1 0 times longer than any other experiment runs. The data from this mission has 
confirmed scientific predictions about burn rate and the amount of fuel remaining 
after the fire goes out. These data will allow scientists to refine theories, and 
possibly develop new ones about combustion by-products such as soot and 
smog. 
Protein Crvstal Growth - Glovebox 
The Protein Crystal Growth - Glovebox is a repeat of the highly successful 
USML-1 experiment. Data from this experiment will be used to confirm the 
advantages of crew interaction in the process of growing crystals in microgravity. 
During the USML-1 mission, the crew interaction enabled the growth of much 
higher quality crystals than ever grown previously. 
Zeolite Crystal Growth - Glovebox 
This investigation extended the USML-1 experiment where on-orbit mixing 
procedures for Zeolite crystal growth experiments were demonstrated. The 
Zeolite crystals are used as catalysts and filters in the chemical processing 
industry. The USML-1 mixing process resulted in more uniform mixing and 
helped minimize bubble formation. 
Colloidal Disorder - Order Transitions 
This investigation obtained additional data on how the density of a substance 
finely and uniformly dispersed within another substance of a different phase - a 
mixture called a colloid- affected its transition from a liquid to an ordered solid 
phase. A number of containers that were holding different concentrations of 
microscopic solid spheres suspended in liquid were placed in the furnace, and 
during the postflight investigation, the scientist determined which concentration 
had a high enough density to arrange the spheres in an ordered state. 
• 
• 
The scientific team observed a stable disc-shaped crystal with dendrites 
(branches) projecting outward from its edges, a phenomenon that had not been 
seen on Earth. The crystals were described as being a snowflake in a glass of 
water that was not melting or dissolving. Photographic data and downlink data • 
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revealed growing crystals throughout a sample that was thought to be too 
densely packed to grow crystals. On Earth, this dense concentration causes the 
sphere to move so slowly that the crystals only form on a geological time scale 
(millions of years). 
Particle Dispersion Experiment 
This investigation studied the microgravity environment influence on fine natural 
particles such as dust, and how the dust particles are dispersed and 
reassembled into larger clusters. This investigation is a continuation of the 
experiment that was begun on USML-1. 
The Particle Dispersion Experiment confirmed the theory concerning the 
behavior of dust and particle clouds in that aggregation occurs in all dust clouds, 
drawn together by static electrical charges. The testing included variations in 
particle size, density of the cloud, and type of material (volcanic material, 
rounded quartz, angular quartz, or copper). All of the materials tested showed a 
similar propensity to aggregate due to electrostatic attraction. 
PROTEIN CRYSTAL GROWTH EXPERIMENTS 
A record number of protein crystal growth experiments were being flown on the 
STS-73 mission. The crystal growth experiments from USML-1 were most 
successful with almost half of the 30 protein crystals grown being large enough 
for X-ray diffraction analysis. The crystals being grown were from proteins that 
are very instrumental in fighting diseases. Postflight evaluation will be required 
to determine the success of the Protein Crystal Growth experiments. 
Single-Locker Protein Crystal Growth - Two Methods 
This experiment processed more than 800 protein samples in a facility designed 
for the production of crystals with enhanced internal order. The protein 
crystallization apparatus for microgravity (PCAM) holds more than six times as 
many samples as are normally accommodated in the same amount of space. 
Crystal Growth by Liquid-Liquid Diffusion 
This experiment used four hand-held diffusion test cells to grow protein crystals 
by diffusing one liquid slowly into another. The units were activated after launch 
and deactivated prior to entry . 
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Commercial Protein Crvstal Growth 
This experiment grew large quantities of crystals of various proteins using the 
batch-process method. A protein crystallization facility was housed in a 
commercial refrigeration/incubation module (CRIM} in the Orbiter middeck. The 
facility contained four cylindrical crystallization chambers which were activated 
when the Shuttle reached orbit. The units were shut down after 100 hours of 
operation. 
Advanced Protein Crystallization Facility 
This facility, developed by the European Space Agency, is the first ever 
designed to provide three methods of protein crystal growth; liquid-liquid 
diffusion, dialysis, and vapor diffusion. Video ·images were made of the crystals 
as they formed, and were used by the scientists to study crystal development in 
microgravity. Fifteen individual experiments were flown in the facility. 
COMMERCIAL GENERIC BIOPROCESSING APPARATUS 
The Commercial Generic Bioprocessing Apparatus allowed in excess of 200 
sophisticated bioprocessing experiments to be performed in one piece of 
hardware. Each experiment was housed in a fluid processing apparatus (FPA}, 
and groups of eight FPA's were activated at one time. Processing was 
terminated automatically, after which the samples were removed and stored for 
return to Earth. This unique facility enabled a large, diverse range of 
commercial investigators, such as pharmaceutical companies, to fly an 
experiment in the Spacelab. 
The facility for the Experiment provided an environment for growing plants, brine 
shrimp, protein crystals as well as other investigations in microgravity. The two 
objectives for this mission were to test the three main subsystems to verify that 
the apparatus was an effective on-orbit plant growth system, and secondly, to 
investigate the nature of starch accumulation in microgravity. 
SPACE ACCELERATION MEASUREMENT SYSTEM 
The Space Acceleration Measurement System (SAMS} measured the 
acceleration environment of the Spacelab module over a specific range of 
frequencies. Sensors were located on the Surface Tension Driven Convection 
Experiment, the Crystal Growth Furnace, and the Glovebox. Data from this 
system will be used to determine the effect of crew movement, equipment 
operations, and Shuttle maneuvers on experiment operations. 
16 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
THREE-DIMENSIONAL MICROGRAVITY ACCELEROMETER 
The Three-Dimensional Microgravity Accelerometer (3-DMA) measured the 
absolute level of microgravity accelerations, and microvibrations that could affect 
the onboard investigations. The scientists made ongoing adjustments to their 
experiments based on readings from the 3-DMA. Loss of some real-time data 
from 3DMA was of minimal impact since all data were recorded onboard. 
SUPPRESSION OF TRANSIENT ACCELERATIONS BY LEVITATION 
EVALUATION 
The Suppression of Transient Accelerations by Levitation Evaluation (STABLE) 
was developed in five months, and was the first facility of its kind. The facility 
enabled testing of a small science experiment to determine how well it can be 
isolated from high-frequency accelerations, including Shuttle operations and 
crew activity. The isolation was accomplished using electromagnetic levitation. 
HIGH-PACKED DIGITAL TELEVISION TECHNICAL DEMONSTRATION 
The High-Packed Digital Television (HI-PAC) was flown as a flight 
demonstration of the new digital television system that operates from the 
Spacelab. It provided researchers on the ground with up to six channels of TV 
when desired. The HI-PAC demonstration provided four times the normal 
amount of video data for scientist feedback during the mission. The system 
collected more than 41 ,000 gigabits of digital data during the demonstration of 
video communication techniques that will help pave the way for Space Station 
experiment operations. 
ORBITAL ACCELERATION RESEARCH EXPERIMENT 
The Orbital Acceleration Research Experiment (OARE) measured microgravity 
levels caused by the atmospheric drag of the Shuttle, changes in Orbiter velocity 
and vibrations of onboard equipment, as well as Shuttle and crew operations. 
Data from the OARE gave the scientists the opportunity to make on-the-spot 
adjustments to their experiments to account for the on-orbit disturbances. 
The OARE data on the payload recorder was reported by Marshall Space Flight 
Center (MSFC) as being poor quality. The data were transmitted on Ku-band 
channel 2 (payload recorder playback). The second TORS ground terminal 
(STGT) reported that the integrated receiver (IR) was not able to maintain lock 
when configured to receive the 640 Kbps Bi-phase-L data from the payload 
recorder. Troubleshooting at the STGT and at Johnson Space Center (JSC) 
revealed that changing the configuration of theIR to 1.28 Mbps NRZ-L resulted 
in good lock and better quality data at MSFC. Additional troubleshooting at 
STGT also revealed that setting theIR loop bandwidth at 4 percent (instead of 
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the nominal 0.1 percent) enabled theIR to maintain lock at the 640 Kbps 
Bi-phase-L configuration. The resolution for the STS-75 mission when 
continuous payload recorder playback via Ku-band channel 2 is required is 
being evaluated. 
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VEHICLE PERFORMANCE 
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
Analysis of the flight data and assessment of the postflight condition of the 
recovered hardware indicates nominal performance of the Solid Rocket Booster 
(SRB) systems. The SRB countdown was normal, and no SRB Launch Commit 
Criteria (LCC) or Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications 
Document (OMRSD) violations occurred. 
No SRB in-flight anomalies were noted; however, data and film analysis show 
hold-down post 2 stud hang-up and subsequent broaching of the hold-down post 
bore at liftoff. This condition did not affect the launch or ascent phase. 
Both SRBs successfully separated from the ET 123.6 seconds after liftoff, and 
reports from visual sightings indicate that the deceleration subsystems 
performed as designed. The SRBs were retrieved and returned to KSC for 
disassembly and refurbishment. 
REUSABLE SOLID ROCKET MOTORS 
The fiftieth Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) set performed nominally with 
all parameters within the Contract End Item (CEI) specification limits. There 
were no LCC violations, and no RSRM in-flight anomalies identified. 
Power up and operation of all igniter and field joint heaters was accomplished 
routinely. All Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) temperatures were 
maintained within acceptable limits throughout the countdown. For this flight, 
the low-pressure heated ground purge in the SRB aft skirt was used to maintain 
the case/nozzle joint temperatures within the required LCC ranges. At 
T-15 minutes, the purge was changed to high pressure to inert the SRB aft skirt. 
Field joint heaters operated 52 hours 36 minutes total, including activations for 
the scrubbed launch attempts, and 11 hours 28 minutes for the successful 
launch countdown. Power was applied for an average of 18 percent of the time 
during the LCC time frame to maintain temperatures in the normal operating 
range. 
Igniter joint heaters operated for 52 hours 25 minutes total, including activations 
for the scrubbed launch attempts, and 11 hours 28 minutes for the successful 
launch countdown. Power was applied to the igniter joints an average of 
34 percent of the time to maintain temperatures in the normal operating range . 
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The aft skirt purge operated for 7 hours 13 minutes total, including activations for 
the scrubbed launch attempts. During two countdowns, the purge was activated • 
to maintain the nozzle/case temperatures above the minimum LCC requirement. 
During the same two countdowns, the high-flow rate purge was activated at 
T-15 minutes to ensure that all hazardous gasses were removed from the aft 
skirt compartments at launch. 
The RSRM propellant mean bulk temperature (PMBT) was 80°F at liftoff. The 
maximum trace-shape variation of pressure vs. time was 2.4 percent at 
73.5 seconds for the left motor and 0.7 percent at 80.0 seconds (right motor). 
The following table presents a comparison of the actual and predicted 
propulsion system performance data. 
RSRM PROPULSION PERFORMANCE 
Parameter Left motor, 80 °F Right motor, 80 °F 
Predicted Actual Predicted Actual 
Impulse gates 
1-20, 106 lbf-sec 65.80 66.17 65.73 65.96 
1-60, 106 lbf-sec 175.35 176.09 175.22 176.33 
I-AT, 106 lbf-sec 297.16 296.83 297.30 296.83 
Vacuum lsp, lbf-sec/lbm 268.6 268.3 268.6 268.2 
Bum rate, in/sec@ 60 oF 0.3664 0.3684 0.3660 0.3685 
at 625 psia 
Burn rate, in/sec @ 80 oF 0.3717 0.3734 0.3713 0.3736 
at 625 psia 
Event times, secondsa 
Ignition interval 0.232 N/A 0.232 N/A 
Webtimeb 109.6 108.7 109.7 108.7 
50 psia cue time 119.3 118.7 119.5 118.2 
Action timeb 121.4 120.7 121.5 120.6 
Separation command 124.4 123.6 124.4 123.6 
PMBT, °F 80 80 80 80 
Maximum ignition rise rate, 90.4 N/A 90.4 NIA 
_Qsia/10 ms 
Decay time, seconds 2.8 2.7 2.8 3.3 
(59.4 psia to 85 K) 
Tailoff Imbalance Impulse Predicted Actual 
differential, Klbf-sec N/A 280.2 
Impulse Imbalance = Integral of the absolute value of the left motor thrust minus 
right motor thrust from web time to action time. 
• 
a All times are referenced to ignition command time except where noted by a b . 
b Referenced to liftoff time (ignition interval). • 
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Postflight inspections of the STS-70 and STS-71 nozzle joints 3 and 4 revealed 
gas paths in the joint room temperature vulcanizing (RTV) and resultant minor 
heat damage to the primary 0-ring. The ensuing investigation showed that gas 
paths occurred in RTV voids, and these were caused by the back-fill closeout 
methods. An understanding of the phenomenon led to the development of a 
technique to repair or rework all nozzle joints 3 and 4 in the flight inventory. 
Postflight inspections and disassembly of STS-73 RSRM's showed that the 
repaired J-joints (igniter and field) performed as designed, and no gas paths 
were noted. However, a gas path was observed through the STS-731eft-hand 
nozzle-to-case joint polysulfide. Soot was observed up to but not past the wiper 
0-ring. The wiper 0-ring was heat affected and eroded with a maximum erosion 
depth of 0.027 inch. 
EXTERNAL TANK 
The ET loading and flight performance was excellent. All flight objectives were 
satisfied. All ET electrical equipment and instrumentation operated nominally, 
All ET purges and heaters operated properly, and there was no unacceptable 
ice/frost formation. No ET LCC or OMRSD violations were identified, nor were 
there any in-flight anomalies identified. 
Typical ice/frost formations were observed on the ET during the countdown. No 
ice or frost was observed on the acreage areas of the ET. Normal quantities of 
ice or frost were present on the liquid oxygen (L02) and liquid hydrogen (LH2) 
feed-lines and on the pressurization line brackets, and some frost or ice was 
present along the LH2 protuberance air load (PAL) ramps. These observations 
were acceptable per NSTS 08303. The Ice/Frost team reported that no 
anomalous thermal protection system (TPS) conditions were found. 
The ET pressurization system functioned properly throughout engine start and 
flight. The minimum L02 ullage pressure experienced during the ullage pressure 
slump was 14.4 psid. 
ET separation was confirmed, and ET entry and breakup occurred within the 
expected footprint, with the impact point 44 nmi. up range of the preflight 
prediction. 
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINES 
All tanking and prelaunch preparations were met. All LCC, ignition confirm 
limits, and mainstage redline margins were satisfactory. All Interface Control 
Document (lCD) start and shutdown transient requirements were met. All 
engines were below the thrust-load-indicator recommended limit during start . 
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Engine performance during start, mainstage, and shutdown was nominal and as 
predicted. • 
The specific impulse (lsp) was rated at 452.87 seconds based on trajectory data. 
Controller and software performance was good. One SSME in-flight anomaly 
was identified. The main fuel valve leak of SSME 1 leaked and caused a scrub 
of the first launch attempt on September 28, 1995. The valve was replaced and 
failure analysis was conducted (Flight Problem STS-73-E-01 ). No anomalous 
conditions were detected on the valve. The leak was attributed to transient 
contamination or nitrogen ice formation on the ball. 
Flight data indicate that the SSME performance during main-stage, throttling, 
shutdown, and propellant dumping operations was normal. High pressure 
oxidizer turbopump (HPOTP) and high pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP) 
temperatures were well within specification throughout engine operation. Main 
engine cutoff (MECO) occurred at T +509.35 seconds. There were no in-flight 
failures identified nor significant problems noted. 
SHUTTLE RANGE SAFETY SYSTEM 
All Shuttle range safety system (SRSS) measurements indicated that the system 
performed nominally. The SRSS closed-loop testing was completed as 
scheduled during the launch countdown. All SRSS safe and arm (S&A) devices • 
were armed and system inhibits turned off at the appropriate times. 
A new high-experience base value (28.48 Vdc under load) was set for the ET 
range safety system (RSS) battery B voltage, which has an upper LCC limit of 
28.8 Vdc. The previous high value was 28.18 Vdc and it was established on 
STS-26. Bench test data shows that the voltage regulator in the range safety 
distributor (RSD) was set to 28.74 Vdc which corresponds directly to a 
28.48 Vdc reading from the onboard instrumentation system. 
As planned, the SRB S&A devices were sated, and SRB system power was 
turned off prior to SRB separation. The ET system remained active until ET 
separation from the Orbiter. 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMS PERFORMANCE 
Main Propulsion System 
The overall performance of the MPS was as expected with no in-flight anomalies 
identified on this first flight with two Block 1 SSMEs installed. The vehicle was 
loaded four times in support of STS-73. Loading for the first launch attempt was 
aborted after transition to reduced fast-fill because of internal leakage of the 
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SSME 1 main fuel valve. The valve was replaced prior to the next loading 
attempt. 
For launch day, L02 and LH2 loading were performed as planned with no stop-
flows or reverts. The ET L02 1 00-percent sensor 2 toggled between wet and dry 
during the preloading sensor checkout. As a result, the sensor was bypassed 
for the 3-hour checkout and for LCC verifications. This sensor is used only for 
ground operations. No OMRSD or LCC violations were identified. 
Throughout the period of preflight operations, no significant hazardous gas 
concentrations were detected. The maximum hydrogen concentration level in 
the Orbiter aft compartment (occurred shortly after the start of fast-fill) was 
approximately 98 ppm, which compares favorably with previous data for this 
vehicle. 
The LH2Ioading operations were normal through chilldown, slow fill, fast fill, 
topping, and replenish. Based on the analysis of loading system data, the LH2 
load at the end of replenish was 231 ,892 Ibm, which when compared with the 
predicted (inventory) load yields a satisfactory difference of +0.03 percent. 
The L02 loading operations were normal during all phases of the loading. 
Based on an analysis of loading system data, the L02 load at the end of 
replenish was 1 ,388, 730 Ibm, which when compared to the predicted load yields 
a satisfactory difference of +0.06 percent. 
Ascent MPS performance was completely normal. Data indicate that the L02 
and LH2 pressurization systems performed as planned, and all net positive 
suction pressure (NPSP) requirements were met throughout the flight. The 
minimum L02 ullage pressure experienced during the period of ullage-pressure 
slump was 14.1 psid. 
This was the first flight of the GH2 pressurization system modifications with all 
modifications incorporated on the vehicle (rotated flow control valve housings in 
the flow control valve manifold, rerouted lines from engine interfaces to flow 
control valve manifold, and the pre-pressurization line filter housing). Filters 
were only installed in SSME 1 and the pre-pressurization line to verify filter 
sizing for design assessment. 
The filter installation was transparent to hydrogen tank pre-pressurization 
operations. The ET LH2 tank reached flight pressure within the expected time 
frame and maintained tank ullage pressure within the required band. 
The GH2 pressurization system functioned nominally during ascent. Review of 
the data showed satisfactory functioning of all flow control valves (FCVs) with no 
• evidence of sluggish performance {newly refurbished FCVs were installed due to 
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the modification activity). Engine outlet pressure differentials were within the 
expected range as predicted by the new analytical model using the new system • 
configuration and engine specific impulse tag values for the SSMEs installed. 
Propellant dumping operations and vacuum inerting were performed 
satisfactorily with nominal results. 
Reaction Control Subsystem 
The reaction control subsystem (RCS) performed acceptably with two in-flight 
anomalies identified. Total propellant usage by the RCS during the mission was 
4,083.4 Ibm. 
The first RCS trim firing was initiated at 293:16:54:40 G.m.t. 
(000:03:01 :40 MET}., and it was a 30-second -X maneuver which imparted a llV 
of 6.9 ft/sec. Thruster F1 F failed off 320 ms after initiation of the firing because 
the chamber pressure (Pc) reached only 17 psia (Flight Problem STS-73-V-03). 
All other thruster firings during the trim maneuver were nominal. The F1 F 
thruster temperature decrease indicated that both propellant valves achieved at 
least pilot-valve flow. The Pc subsequently required about 15 minutes to return 
to zero psia. The fact that the Pc decreased so slowly indicates that the thruster 
fail-off condition was caused by a blockage of the Pc tube orifice. This Pc tube 
was last flushed during the STS-73 processing flow. The Pc tube was inspected • 
on the vehicle for blockage and none was found. However, the problem does 
appear to be within the F1 F pressure-sensing system. The thruster was 
replaced. 
At approximately 300:18:04 G.m.t. (007:04:11 MET), RCS vernier thrusters R5R 
and R5D failed off. The R5D and R5R vernier thrusters failed to fire seven more 
times when commanded, and the L3D and R3D primary RCS thrusters failed off 
once. The failure signature was essentially the same for each occurrence. As a 
result, the aft manifold 3 primary thrusters were placed in last priority for entry. 
The fail-offs were caused by a command path problem that is discussed in the 
Avionics section of this report. 
Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem 
The orbital maneuvering subsystem (OMS) performed satisfactorily for the two 
firings made by the system (OMS 2 and deorbit firing). The OMS fired for a total 
of 281.3 seconds with no in-flight anomalies noted, and a total of 10,864.5 Ibm of 
propellants were used during the two firings. There was no RCS interconnect 
usage during this mission. 
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Power Reactant Storage and Distribution Subsystem 
The power reactant storage and distribution (PRSD) subsystem performed 
nominally throughout the mission. A total of 5383 Ibm of oxygen and 652 Ibm of 
hydrogen were consumed during the mission. Consumables remaining would 
support a mission extension of 70 hours at an average power level of 19.5 kW. 
The PRSD supplied 204 Ibm of oxygen to the environmental control and life 
support system for crew breathing. 
At 308:13:42 G.m.t. (014:23:49 MED, when the hydrogen and oxygen manifold 
isolation valves were being cycled for the in-flight checkout, the hydrogen 
manifold 1 isolation valve failed to close when commanded (Flight Problem 
STS-73-V-08). Four minutes later, the switch was held in the CLOSE position 
for 10 seconds, but the valve position again did not change. Heater cycles 
confirmed that the valve was still open. No further attempts were made to 
operate this valve during the mission. This failure did not impact the mission. 
The valve was cycled postlanding and operated properly. This valve also failed 
to close on STS-43 (OV-1 04), after it had cycled satisfactorily five times on that 
flight. The valve remained on the vehicle and cycled nominally for three 
additional flights. The valve was removed during the OMDP for cryogenic 
screening, which it passed satisfactorily, and then installed on OV-1 02 during 
this vehicle's OMDP. ·The valve was removed and replaced during turnaround 
activities following this mission (STS-73) . 
Oxygen tank 3 experienced a pressure collapse to 544 psia at 73 percent 
quantity due to destratification. The quantity dropped to 65 percent before 
recovering. The pressure remained above the two-phase region throughout the 
flight; consequently, the destratification was not a constraint to the use of this 
tank. 
Fuel Cell Powerplant Subsystem 
The fuel cell powerplant (FCP) subsystem performed nominally throughout the 
mission and generated 7 446 kWh of electrical energy for subsystem and 
payload usage. The average power level during the mission was 19.5 kW and 
644 amperes. The fuel cells used 51791bm of oxygen and 6521bm of hydrogen 
and produced 5831 Ibm of water as a by-product of the electrical energy 
production. Six purges were made of the fuel cells during the mission. The 
actual fuel cell voltages at the end of the mission were 0.1 0 Vdc above that 
predicted for fuel cells 1 and 2 and 0.15 Vdc above that predicted for fuel cell 3. 
The overall performance degradation during the mission was 0.1 0 Vdc for fuel 
cell 1 and 0.15 Vdc for fuel cells 2 and 3. 
A problem that was noted during prelaunch operations persisted throughout the 
mission. The fuel cell 3 substack 1 cell performance monitor (CPM) differential 
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v~ltage measurement was latched at the full-scale high value of 500 mVdc. This 
condition existed because of an out-of-limit self-test input. Loss of this • 
measurement was a constraint to launch; consequently, a waiver was approved 
for flight. The CPM was replaced during the turnaround activities following this 
mission. 
Auxiliary Power Unit Subsystem 
The auxiliary power unit {APU} subsystem performed satisfactorily throughout 
the mission. As a result of water spray boiler 3 spray-bar freeze-up during 
ascent that caused the APU 3lubrication oil return temperature to increase to 
326 °F, the decision was made to shut down APU 3 earlier than planned. The 
temperature reached 332 oF before cooling began; however, this over-heating of 
the lubrication oil return did not impact mission operations. The following table 
presents the APU serial numbers that were flown, and the fuel consumption and 
run times for the APUs. 
APU RUN-TIMES AND FUEL CONSUMPTION 
APU 1 (S/N 402) APU2 (S/N 303) APU3 (SIN 403} 
Flight Time, Fuel Time, Fuel Time, Fuel 
phase min:sec consumption, min:sec consumption, min:se consumption, 
lb lb c lb 
Ascent 21:53 47 22:09 58 18:55 43 
FCS 12:19 27 
checkout 
Entrya 63:34 117 82:09 187 63:35 120 
Total 85:27 164 104:18 245 94:49 190 
a The APUs were shut down approximately 18 minutes 45 seconds after main 
gear touchdown, following a hydraulic load test. 
Approximately 45 minutes after the postlanding shut down of the APUs, the 
pump inlet pressure of APU 1 had decayed from 150 psia to 35 psia during the 
previous 20-minute period. The drain-line pressure rose from 20.5 psia to 
22.0 psia during the same period, indicating leakage across the fuel pump seal 
{Flight Problem STS-73-V-09}. During postflight operations, 108 cc of liquid was 
drained from the APU 1 catch bottle. The APU was replaced. 
Hydraulics/Water Spray Boiler Subsystem 
The hydraulics/WSB subsystem performed nominally during the mission, and 
one in-flight anomaly was noted during ascent. 
The October 6 launch attempt was scrubbed prior to ET loading when the data 
showed a 16-percent drop in reservoir quantity, and it was determined that 
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hydraulic fluid had been inadvertently drained from hydraulic system 1 following 
the SSME 1 main fuel valve replacement. A compressibility test of the system 
was performed, and it showed that the air content was 1 .24 percent and should 
have been no greater than 1.0 percent. This level was determined to be 
satisfactory for launch, and a waiver was generated to document the 
higher-than-normal air content and its acceptability for launch. 
During ascent, WSB 3 experienced a freeze-up as evidenced by the APU 3 
lubrication oil return temperature increasing above the normal spray start 
temperature of 250 oF (Flight Problem STS-73-V-02). When the temperature 
reached 297 °F, the crew was requested to switch from controller A to controller 
8 on system 3. However, the boiler was apparently shut off instead, and when 
the temperature reached 316 °F the crew was requested to turn the boiler power 
back on and switch to controller B. After switching controllers, the temperature 
rise rate did not change, indicating a spray bar freeze-up. When the 
temperature reached 326 °F, the crew was directed to shut down APU 3 earlier 
than planned. Approximately one minute later, WSB 3 (on controller B) began 
spraying, indicating that the spray bar had thawed. All three WSBs had the 
water feed-line heater modification that was implemented to preclude WSB 
freeze-ups. This heater modification was also flown on STS-69/0V-105 on 
WSB3 .. 
APU 3 and WSB 3 were used for the FCS checkout, and both controller A and 8 
were also exercised during this checkout. Although under-cooling to a 
temperature of 273 °F and a subsequent over-cooling to 236 °F were 
experienced, lubrication oil cooling on the WSB 3 controller A was satisfactory. 
In addition, WSB 3 performance with controller B was satisfactory during entry. 
Postflight troubleshooting verified that the water feed-line heater is functioning 
normally. Controller A was removed and sent to the vendor for troubleshooting. 
With a replacement controller A installed, further testing of the WSB found no 
anomalies. 
The APUs were shut down in the 3, 1, and 2 order with APU 3 being shut down 
about 3 minutes prior to APU 1 and 2. No anomalous pressure hang-ups or 
power drive unit (PDU) motor back-driving was noted on any system during the 
APU shut-down sequence. 
During on-orbit operations, brake isolation valve 3 was opened for a short period 
of time to maintain the hydraulic fluid temperature for the brake modules above 
-4 °F .. Total circulation pump runs were 51 on system 1, 36 on system 2, and 
44 on system 3, and circulation pump operation was nominal throughout the 
mission. 
Hydraulic system performance during entry was satisfactory with hydraulic heat 
• exchanger mode being achieved for all three systems. A hydraulic load test was 
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performed postlanding during which systems 1 and 3 were alternately taken to 
low pressure and the aerosurfaces exercised. All operations were nominal 
during the load test. 
Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem 
The electrical power distribution and control (EPDC) subsystem performed 
satisfactorily with the exceptions discussed in the following subparagraphs. 
During prelaunch operations, no drive current was observed on AC 1 phase B 
when the left vent door 8/9 was driven. After main engine cutoff, when closing 
the Orbiter/ET doors following ET separation, AC 1 phase B current did not 
power the four motors normally supported by this circuit. This loss caused these 
motors to operate on two phases. Data evaluation indicated that the most 
probable cause of the failure was an open circuit of phase B between CB 4 on 
panel MA73C and aft motor controller assembly (AMCA) 1. AC1 phase B 
current was not present during any of the vent door 8/9 repositioning during the 
remainder of the mission or during the ET door opening postlanding. Believing 
that oxidation of the circuit breaker contact was a likely cause of the problem, 
CB 4 on panel MA73C was cycled during postlanding operations, and the AC1 
phase 8 current returned. No further action is required. 
• 
During postlanding activities at KSC, when the midbody motor control assembly • 
(MMCA) 3 logic power main bus B switch was placed in the off position, the 
associated operational status (OP STAT) indications for OP STAT 8, OP STAT 
11, and OP STAT 12 failed to power down. The events eventually cycled to the 
nominal off condition approximately 4 hours after the logic power switch was 
placed in the off position. This same condition occurred following the last flight 
of this vehicle (STS-65), and at that time required 6.5 hours to reach the nominal 
off condition. The problem is suspected to be a leaky remote power controller in 
the midpower controller assembly (MPCA) -2. There is no mission impact 
associated with this condition. 
Environmental Control and Life Support System 
The environmental control and life support system (ECLSS) performed 
satisfactorily throughout the mission. 
The active thermal control system (ATCS) operation was satisfactory throughout 
the mission. The ATCS successfully supported payload cooling requirements by 
placing both of the Freon coolant loops' (FCLs) flow proportioning valves in the 
payload position prior to Spacelab activation. The loop was returned to the 
interchanger position for entry as part of the Spacelab deactivation procedure. 
28 
• 
• 
• 
• 
The flash evaporator system (FES) feedline A mid 2 temperature measurement 
slowly decreased beginning at approximately 293:19:53 G.m.t. (00:05:30 MEn, 
and the heater did not cycle. Based on previous flight data, a heater cycle would 
have been expected at approximately 70 °F. When the temperature reached 
54.7 oF at approximately 296:17:16 G.m.t. (003:03:23 MET), the FES feedline A 
mid 2 heater system 1 was declared failed off (Flight Problem STS-73-V-04). 
The FES feedline A mid 2 heater system 2 was activated and cycled nominally 
for the remainder of the mission. Troubleshooting isolated the problem to a 
broken wire at a ground lug. The wire was repaired. 
At 304:21:48 G.m.t. (011 :07:55 MET}, the topping FES experienced an under-
temperature shutdown. The shutdown was caused by operating the topping 
evaporator at a heat load between 35,000 and 38,000 Btu, which exceeded the 
design-specified capability (30,000 Btu) stated in the Shuttle Operational Data 
Book. Contributing factors to this heat load included Beta angle, vehicle 
attitude, and lower port radiator efficiency due to the 52-degree-open port-door 
position, which resulted in panel temperatures in excess of 75 °F. The primary 
controller A was reset, and FES operation was restored. Nine additional FES 
shutdowns occurred during the next 24 hours. As a result, the decision was 
made to leave the port payload bay door fully open following the third thermal 
conditioning period for the port MLG tires that was initiated at 306:08:23 G.m.t. 
(012:18:30 MET). With the door fully open, no additional FES under-
temperature shut downs occurred during the mission, and there were no further 
thermal issues with the attitude timeline for the remainder of the mission. No 
postflight action was required. 
Freon coolant loop (FCL) 1 experienced erratic flow in the interchanger and 
payload legs. The flow oscillations returned to normal for two short periods of 
time and the flow-rates remained steady throughout most of the mission. This 
condition is believed to be associated with the documented overall flow 
degradation, and the erratic-flow condition did not impact the mission. The 
filtered components (flow proportioning valve, radiator flow controller assembly, 
and pump inlet filter) in FCL 1 were replaced. 
The radiator cold-soak provided cooling during entry through touchdown plus 
5 minutes when ammonia boiler system (ABS) A was activated using the 
primary/GPC controller. To minimize thermal stress on the crew after a 
long-duration flight, ammonia cooling was activated early by selecting the high 
outlet temperature set point (57 °F) on both FCL radiator flow controllers when 
the radiator controller outlet temperatures exceeded 40 °F. This provided the 
necessary heat load for the ABS and avoided the increased cabin temperature 
and humidity transient which occurs during nominal postlanding operations 
between cold-soak depletion and ammonia activation. System A operated for 
37 minutes before ground cooling was connected and operational. 
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The atmospheric revitalization system (ARS) performance was nominal. The 
ARS air and water coolant loops performed normally. Cabin temperature and 
relative humidity peaked at 82.2 oF and 50.8 percent, respectively. Avionics 
bays 1, 2, and 3 air outlet temperatures peaked at acceptable levels of 
102.9 °F, 104.9 °F, and 89.7 °F, respectively. Avionics bays 1, 2, and 3 water 
cold-plate temperatures peaked at acceptable levels of 88.2 °F, 91.1 °F, and 
81 °F, respectively. 
The regenerative C02 removal system (RCRS) was activated after MECO, and 
the RCRS operated nominally throughout the mission. The cabin C02 partial 
pressure was maintained below a level of 4.59 mmHg, which was satisfactory. 
The atmospheric revitalization pressure control system performed nominally. 
During the redundant component check, the pressure control configuration was 
switched to the alternate system. Both systems exhibited normal operation. 
The supply water and waste management system performed nominally 
throughout the mission. Supply water was managed through the use of the FES 
and overboard dump systems. A total of 18 supply water dumps (three of which 
were simultaneous with waste water dumps) were performed at an average 
dump rate of 1.56 percent/minute (2.581b/minute). The supply water dump line 
temperature was maintained between 76 °F and 107 oF throughout the mission 
with the operation of the line heater. 
Waste water was gathered at approximately the predicted rate. Three waste 
water dumps were performed at an average rate of 2.08 percent/minute 
(3.44 lb/minute). The waste water dump line temperature was maintained 
between 53 oF and 79 oF throughout the mission. The vacuum vent line 
temperature was maintained between 59 oF and 73 °F, and the nozzle 
temperature remained in a range between 1 00 oF and 157 °F. 
The waste collection system performed nominally throughout the mission. 
Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression Subsystem 
The performance of the smoke detection subsystem was nominal and showed no 
indication of smoke generation during the flight. Use of the fire suppression 
subsystem was not required. 
Airlock Support System 
The performance of the airlock support system and tunnel adapter was nominal 
throughout the mission. Use of the airlock support components was not required 
because there was no extravehicular activity. 
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Avionics and Software Support Subsystems 
The avionics and software support subsystem performed satisfactorily with the 
following exceptions. 
The launch on October 7 was scrubbed when master events controller 1 (MEC 
1) built-in test equipment (BITE) word 5, bit 9, indicated that the MEC 1 core 8 
critical drivers were not enabled (Flight Problem STS-73-V-01). MEC 1 was 
replaced and satisfactorily retested. 
Vernier RCS thrusters R5R and R5D failed to fire when commanded at 
300:18:04 G.m.t. (007:04:11 MET} (Flight Problem STS-73-V-05). Data show 
that the fire command B was issued for one sample to both thrusters, but no 
driver output or Pc was indicated for either thruster. Since Pc was not present, 
the redundancy management (RM) software deselected both thrusters. Because 
no indication of a thruster failure was present, both the R5D and R5R thrusters 
were hot-fired and each provided a good one-second pulse. The two vernier 
thrusters were then reselected for flight use. 
At approximately 306:14:38 G.m.t. (013:00:45 MEn, RCS vernier thrusters R5R 
and R5D again failed off. The signature was similar to that of the previous 
failure of these thrusters. Since the crew was instructed to reselect the thrusters 
without performing the hot-fire procedure, the thrusters were reselected and fired 
nominally when required. At 306:20:52 G.m.t. (013:06:59: MEn, the R5D and 
R5R vernier thrusters again failed to fire when commanded. The failure 
signature was verified as the same signature as the first occurrence. A few 
minutes after this occurrence, the crew reselected the thrusters, and the 
thrusters failed when commanded to fire. The thrusters were reselected about 
30 minutes later, and the thrusters fired properly. 
The R5R and R5D thrusters failed off a fourth, fifth and sixth time. Following the 
sixth occurrence, the primary RCS thrusters were selected. Primary RCS 
thrusters L3D and R3D subsequently annunciated fail-off at 307:19:44 G.m.t. 
(014:05:51 MET). Thruster data show a signature similar to the failure of vernier 
thrusters R5R and R5D in that the chamber pressure remained at 0 psia and the 
injector temperatures indicated no propellant flow. The jet-driver output 
indication and command B were not present during the fail-off. Commands for 
these two primary thrusters share MOM FA2 cards and channels with vernier 
thrusters R5R and R5D, as well as with primary thrusters L3A, R3A, L3L, and 
R3R. As a result, the aft manifold 3 primary thrusters were placed in last priority 
for entry. Following the fail-off of the two primary thrusters, the vernier thrusters 
were reselected and thrusters R5R and R5D were brought on line. Two 
additional occurrences (seventh and eighth) of the R5R and R5D vemier 
thrusters failing off occurred during the remainder of the mission . 
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Extensive postflight troubleshooting was performed and as of this writing, the 
problems was not repeated. The MOM (SIN 121) and RJD (SIN 20) were 
removed and replaced. Troubleshooting on the Orbiter failed to reproduce the 
anomaly. The MOM and the RJD were replaced, and failure analysis of the 
removed components also has not identified the problem. 
A similar failure of thruster R5D occurred during the previous flight of this vehicle 
(STS-65), and troubleshooting failed to indicate the cause. The MOM (S/N 121) 
and the RJD (S/N 20) in the command path to the R5D and R5R vernier 
thrusters as well as the aft manifold 3 primary thrusters are the same units flown 
on STS-65. 
A vernier RCS hot-fire test was performed on flight day 16, during which RCS 
thrusters LSD and R5D were fired for 20 seconds. Linear acceleration data was 
recorded by the OARE and SAMS accelerometers. These data will be used to 
improve the understanding of the effect of vernier thrust impingement on the 
Orbiter, and this should lead to a refinement of models and better on-orbit 
vehicle control. 
At 308:08:55 G.m.t. (014:19:02 MET}, the crew reported that cathode ray tube 
(CRT) 2 (SIN 24) was flashing on and off and that the symbols on the screen 
were garbled (Flight Problem STS-73-V-07). These symptoms were intermittent, 
• 
and the data indicated a problem with the CRT. As a result, an IFM procedure • 
was performed to switch the CRTs in position 2 and 4, and the CRT in position 
2 performed satisfactorily for the remainder of the mission. The failed CRT in 
position 4 was not repowered for the remainder of the mission. Initial indications 
are that the failure was caused by the deflection amplifier or the high voltage 
power supply. Postflight, the CRT in position 4 was removed and replaced, and 
the installation of the CRT in position 2 was verified. 
The displays and controls operated nominally with the exception of one minor 
problem. When closing the Orbiter/External Tank (ET) doors following ET 
separation, AC 1 phase B current did not power the four motors normally 
supported by this circuit. The current was present after the postflight cycling of 
the circuit breaker, and no postflight action was required. This problem is 
discussed in greater detail in the Electrical Power Distribution and Control 
section of this report. 
Communications and Tracking Subsystems 
The communications and tracking subsystem performance was acceptable 
during the ascent, on-orbit and entry phases of the mission. The following 
paragraphs discuss the anomalies and problems that were noted during the 
mission. 
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Performance of the S-band lower right antennas was degraded in both the high-
and low-frequency modes with either power amplifier selected (Flight Problem 
STS-73-V-06). An examination of data from 20 orbits indicated that there were 
no noticeable differences between transmissions on the high and low 
frequencies, and that the dropouts were on both TDRSs. Troubleshooting and 
testing were performed later in the mission to further define the S-band lower-
right-antenna degraded performance problem. The troubleshooting and testing 
activity indicated that the problem was most likely in the path between the lower-
right antenna and the antenna switch. Apparently, the cables were heating up 
and an arcing effect was occurring that caused the degradation. Postflight 
troubleshooting repeated the problem on an intermittent basis. The lower right 
antenna was replaced; however, dropouts were still received during 
transmit/receive tests. 
Color television camera (TVC) 1 in the Spacelab module had flickering 
horizontal color bands scrolling at a high rate through its downlinked image. 
This is the first flight of this particular camera. This video was being downlinked 
through the HI-PAC digital television demonstration equipment. The black and 
white video was acceptable for science documentation. Later, TVC-1 video was 
down linked through the Ku-band system in analog form, and the color video was 
good. The crew swapped the TVC-1 and TVC-2 inputs to the HI-PAC, and the 
video quality improved on TVC-1 without any degradation to TVC-2. This 
configuration was used for the remainder of the mission, and the performance 
was nominal. 
Structures and Mechanical Subsystems 
When the payload bay doors were opened at the beginning of on-orbit 
operations, the port door was initially placed at the 52-degree open position to 
protect the radiators from micrometeorite or orbital debris impacts. At 
approximately 298:13:43 G.m.t. (004:23:50 MET), the port payload bay door was 
taken to the full-open position in support of the mission's only Spacelab 
condensate dump. The door was moved back to the 52-degree open position 
following the dump at approximately 298:14:20 G.m.t. (005:00:27 MET). Video 
of the door centerline was taken before and after repositioning. The video was 
reviewed, and no anomalous conditions were found. Also, the payload bay door 
was moved to the full-open position several times for thermal reasons following 
the condensate dump and all door-drive cycles were nominal. 
The tires and brakes were in good condition for a landing on the KSC concrete 
runway. The table on the following page presents the landing and braking 
parameters for the STS-73 mission . 
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Landing and Braking Parameters 
From 
Parameter threshold, Speed, Sink rate, ft/sec Pitch rate, 
ft keas deg!sec 
Main gear touchdown 2579 212.3 - 2.2 N/A 
Nose gear touchdown 7098 156.6 N/A -4.9 
Brake initiation speed 119.6 knots 
Brake-on time 35.4 seconds 
Rollout distance 9,038 feet 
Rollout time 55.6 seconds 
Runway 33 (Concrete) KSC SLF 
Orbiter weight at landing 230,200 lb 
Peak 
Brake sensor pressure, Brake assembly Energy, 
location psi a million ft-lb 
Left-hand inboard 1 1032 Left-hand inboard 21.17 
Left-hand inboard 3 1008 
Left-hand outboard 2 960 Left-hand outboard 19.97 
Left-hand outboard 4 984 
Right-hand inboard 1 1344 Right-hand inboard 23.98 
Right-hand inboard 3 1272 
Right-hand outboard 2 1392 Right-hand outboard 25.23 
Right-hand outboard 4 1320 
Integrated Aerodynamics. Heating and Thermal Interfaces 
Ascent and entry aerodynamics were nominal. 
Ascent heating was nominal; however, entry heating was greater than previously 
experienced. See the Thermal Protection Subsystem and Window subsection 
for entry heating effects on the TPS. 
Thermal interfaces were nominal. 
Thermal Control Subsystem 
The thermal control subsystem performed satisfactorily except for the FES 
feedline A mid 2 heater system 1, which failed off {Flight Problem STS-73-V-04). 
The loss of this heater did not impact the mission or proper maintenance of FES 
feedline temperatures. 
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Aerothermodynamics 
The entry performance of aerothermodynamics was satisfactorily; however, the 
lower midfuselage and lower aft fuselage heating was the highest experienced 
on any flight in these two areas. All temperatures were within the design 
capability of the vehicle. Early transition may have occurred as a gap filler was 
protruding approximately 1.5 inches and was folded over from the high heating. 
This protrusion may have caused an early transition, but it does not appear to 
have caused an assymetric transition. Data analysis is continuing. 
Thermal Protection Subsystem and Windows 
The thermal protection subsystem (TPS) performed satisfactorily in 
accomplishing the task of protecting the vehicle during all phases of the mission. 
At approximately 300:07:18 G.m.t. (06:17:25 MET}, the crew reported a small 
impact crater on window W2. The crew estimated the size of the crater to be 
approximately 1 mm in diameter. The crater was located near the edge of the 
window closest the vehicle centerline. Camcorder video and electronic still 
camera images of the impact site were analyzed, and the assessment of the 
damage indicated that the impact was not a concern for the mission . 
Structural temperature measurements along the aft center-line of the lower 
fuselage recorded the highest peak and differential temperatures in the Space 
Shuttle Program, exceeding previous maximums by as much as 19 °F. Some 
lower surface TPS materials showed signs of excessive heating. In particular, 
the ET door thermal barriers (TBs), which were on their first flight, were thermally 
degraded and embrittled. Six of the seven ET TBs on each side will be 
replaced. A large area of tile damage on the lower surface had glazed substrate 
material and peeled coating. Slumped tiles were also found on the left-hand 
wing, the left-hand forward chine area, and aft of the right-hand main landing 
gear door (MLGD). Also, a higher-than-average number of charred filler bar 
locations were noted early in the flow. This may be an effect of the vehicle 
landing weight, which was the highest ever flown (230,200 lb), and the high 
inclination (39 degrees). However, structural temperature measurements on the 
forward fuselage and both wings were not exceedingly high, indicating a 
possible early boundary layer transition event on the lower aft fuselage 
centerline. This was confirmed by the modular auxiliary data system (MADS} 
surface thermocouple data, which indicates that transition occurred at 
880 seconds on the lower aft centerline of the vehicle. At the forward centerline 
locations, (available on port side only} transition was recorded at various times 
between 1240 and 1305 seconds, which is well after the average transition time 
of 1200 seconds . 
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The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 147 hits of which 26 had a major dimension 
of 1 inch or larger. The following table shows the distribution of hits by areas of • 
the Orbiter. This total does not reflect the numerous hits on the base heat shield 
that are attributed to the flame arrestment sparkler system. A comparison with 
56 previous missions of the same configuration indicates both the total number 
of hits as well as the number of hits 1 inch or larger were greater than average. 
TPS DAMAGE SITES 
Orbiter Surfaces Hits> 1 Inch Total hits 
Lower Surface 17 102 
Upper Surface 6 35 
Right Side 0 2 
Left Side 1 4 
Right OMS Pod 1 1 
Left OMS Pod 1 3 
Total 26 147 
The postlanding inspection revealed 102 hits (average is 92) of which 17 were 
greater than 1 inch (average is 14) on the lower surface. The largest lower 
surface tile damage site occurred approximately 1 0 feet forward of the right-hand 
MLG wheel well and measured 11 inches long by 3.8 inches wide by 0.8 inch • 
deep. The site showed significant signs of entry heating including interior 
glazing, slumping at the tile edge, and melting of the surface coating material. 
Another damage site 2.3 inches long by 0.8 inch wide aft of the right-hand MLG 
wheel well exhibited a cavity angled from the tile surface to a depth of 
approximately 1.5 inches. This site was located aft of the right-hand MLG door. 
Many tile damage sites were located right of the center-line on the lower surface. 
Hits in this area along a line from nose to tail are generally attributed to ice 
impacts from the ET liquid oxygen feed-line bellows and support brackets. Two 
gap fillers inboard of the right-hand MLG wheel well and one gap filler aft of the 
nose landing gear (NLG) wheel well protruded from lower surface tiles. 
Tile damage sites aft of the liquid hydrogen ET/Orbiter umbilicals was typical of 
that observed on previous flights. The damage was most likely caused by 
impacts from umbilical ice or shredded pieces of umbilical purge barrier material 
flapping in the air stream. 
A tile damage site 1.0 inch long by 0.75 inch wide by 0.75 inch deep was located 
on the left side of the Orbiter nose at the forward RCS pod +X, -Y, -Z corner. 
The damage site did not exhibit the fore-to-aft impact for any sharp edges typical 
of contact with adjacent tiles. The possibility of a micrometeorite or on-orbit 
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debris impact while the port side of the vehicle was facing the velocity vector is 
being investigated. 
The ET/Orbiter separation devices functioned normally, although numerous 
pieces of damaged clips were noted. All ET/Orbiter umbilical separation 
ordnance retention shutters were closed properly, and virtually no umbilical 
closeout foam or white RTV dam material adhered to the umbilical plate near the 
liquid hydrogen recirculation line disconnect. Although no debris was found on 
the runway beneath the umbilical cavities after wheel stop, a 2-inch long by 1/4-
inch wide by 1/8-inch thick piece of white RTV had fallen from the liquid 
hydrogen ET/Orbiter umbilical plate onto one of the left ET door hinges. A 
scorched piece of vinyl or mylar tape 1-inch square adhered to the umbilical well 
16 mm camera window. 
All three dome mounted heat shield (DMHS) closeout blankets were in excellent 
condition with no missing material. The DMHS blankets at the SSME 1 5:00 and 
7:00 o'clock positions were torn and frayed. No body flap hinge stub (piano key) 
tiles were missing or damaged, and the tiles on the vertical stabilizer stinger and 
around the drag chute door were intact and undamaged. Two tiles on the left 
side of the rudder/speed brake were missing corner material 1.0-inch by 1.0-inch 
by 0.5 inch down to the strain isolation pad (SIP). These two damage sites were 
caused by vibration, not debris impacts . 
A white residue was observed around the waste-water dump nozzles. No 
unusual amounts of tile damage occurred on the leading edges of the OMS 
pods. However, one small tile damage site was noted on the leading edge of the 
vertical stabilizer Shuttle Infrared Leeside Temperature Sensing (SILTS) pod, 
and it measured 0.75-inch long by 0.25-inch wide by 0.5-inch deep. 
Orbiter windows 3 and 4 exhibited moderate hazing and streaking. A light haze 
was present on the other windows. Tile damage on the window perimeter tiles 
was concentrated around windows 2, 3, and 5. The tile damage sites were 
caused by impacts from forward RCS paper cover pieces and RTV. Some of the 
damage sites were previous tile repairs that had vibrated loose. Five damage 
sites in the tiled area between windows 3 and 4 were also noted . 
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FLIGHT CREW EQUIPMENT/GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT 
The crew reported that the Arriflex camera was inoperative after being used for 
more than a day. The battery pack on the camera was replaced with a second 
unit which lasted approximately two minutes before the camera again became 
inoperative (Flight Problem STS-73-F-01 ). The crew reported that no battery 
test light (green or red) appeared when the test button was depressed, and that 
the camera was making an abnormal noise during operation. The batteries were 
replaced in one of the battery packs, but the problem persisted. During 
troubleshooting of one of the battery packs, a 3-ampere fuse in the battery pack 
was found to be open. Flight rules prohibit connecting Orbiter power into a 
possible short. As a result, the IFM procedure that connects the camera to 
Orbiter power was not performed. The camera was stowed for the remainder of 
the mission. 
Two unsuccessful attempts at uplinking a thermal impulse printer system (TIPS) 
message occurred at 295:17:00 G.m.t. (02:03:07 MET) and at 297:21:45 G.m.t. 
(04:07:52 MET). In each case, a power cycle recovered the TIPS. This problem 
recurred at 298:23:29 G.m.t. (005:09:36 MET}, and the crew was instructed to 
install the spare TIPS (Flight Problem STS-73-F-02). The spare TIPS operated 
satisfactorily for the remainder of the mission. The first TIPS unit was tested 
postflight, and the results were not complete at the time of this writing. 
Audio interface unit (AIU) B lost its receive capability on channel1 (Flight 
Problem STS-73-F-03). Channel2 performance was nominal. A failure of the 
synthesizer in the channel is the most likely cause of the failure. Postflight 
troubleshooting and repair will be performed. 
The electronic still camera experienced low-battery failure. Battery cycling and 
recharge procedures were performed with no success. Workaround 
procedures, using Orbiter power or recharging the battery after every five 
pictures were taken, were used successfully. All required photography was 
performed, and downlink of the photographs was performed nominally. 
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CARGO INTEGRATION 
Cargo integration hardware performance was satisfactory with no anomalies or 
problems noted. 
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DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES/DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY 
OBJECTIVES 
A total of 13 Development Test Objectives (DTOs) and 12 Detailed 
Supplementary Objectives (DSOs) were assigned to the STS-73 mission. 
Eleven of the 12 DTOs were performed, and all of the DSOs were performed. 
Preliminary results are presented, when available, in the following paragraphs. 
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES 
Three of the 13 DTOs were data-only, and the data were recorded on the 
modular auxiliary data system (MADS) recorder, which was dumped postflight. 
The data have been given to the sponsors for evaluation and the results will be 
presented in separate documentation. 
1. DTO 301 D- Ascent Structural Capability Evaluation; 
2. DTO 307D - Entry Structural Capability Evaluation; and 
3. DTO 319D - Shuttle/Payload Low Frequency Environment. 
The remaining 1 0 DTOs are presented in the following subparagraphs. 
• 
DTO 312- ET TPS Performance (Methods 1 and 3)- Umbilical Cameras and • 
Hand-Held Camera) - No +X translation maneuver was performed. A total of 
37 photographs were taken of the ET. Analysis of the film showed the ET to be 
1.37 kilometers away when the first photograph was taken at 16 minutes after 
liftoff, and approximately 3.0 kilometers away when the final photograph was 
taken. The tank separation velocity was 4.42 meters/second. The ET roll rate 
was calculated to be 0.15 deg/sec, and the tumble rate was 1.91 deg/sec. 
Three rolls of umbilical well camera film of the ET were acquired; one 35 mm film 
from the L02 umbilical and the two 16 mm films (5 mm lens and 10 mm lens) 
from the LH2 umbilical. Analysis of the films revealed no significant areas of 
damage or erosion. 
DTO 414- APU Shutdown Test [Sequence B- (APU s 2, 1, 3)] -This DTO was 
performed; however, the sequence A order of APU shutdown (3, 1, 2) was used 
because APU 3 was shutdown early as a result of lubrication oil temperatures. 
Data review has shown that no back-driving of the PDU occurred. Data 
gathering for DTO 414 has been completed with this flight, and the DTO will not 
be performed on any future flight of any of the Orbiters. 
DTO 623 - Cabin Air Monitoring - Cabin air samples were collected as 
prescribed. These samples have been given to the sponsor for evaluation, and 
the results of the evaluation will be reported in separate documentation. • 
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DTO 655 - Foot Restraint (Hardware part of USML-2 Complement) - The foot 
restraint was evaluated, and the results were given to the sponsor. The results 
of the evaluation by the sponsor will be published in separate documentation. 
DTO 667 - Portable In-Flight Landing Operations Trainer - The Portable In-Flight 
Landing Operations Trainer (PILOT} was exercised by the crew as planned. 
This simulation program serves as a valuable aid in maintaining proficiency 
during a long-duration mission. 
DTO 679 - Ku-Band Communications Adapter Demonstration - The objectives of 
the Ku-band Communications Adapter (KCA) DTO were met. An interactive 
white-board was established to demonstrate an IFM procedure. Video tape 
recorder control from the ground was also demonstrated. An extensive number 
of science files were down-linked during the mission, and these proved to be a 
valuable asset to the scientific community working the STS-73 mission. The 
capability to uplink data was also demonstrated. 
DTO 682 - Inertial Vibration Isolation System Evaluation - The evaluation of real-
time accelerometer data indicated nominal operations of the Inertial Vibration 
Isolation System (IVIS). The high-gain setting could not be used; however, this 
condition was not a detriment to science or the exercise. Stow procedures 
required modification because of the inability to set the gain at high . 
DTO 805 - Crosswind Landing Performance - This DTO was not performed as 
the minimum crosswind speed conditions were not present at the time of landing. 
DTO 913 - Microgravity Measuring Device Evaluation -The Microgravity 
Measuring Device (MMD) provided acceleration data during various periods of 
the mission. These data were downlinked via the KCA, and the data were very 
helpful for the science community. 
DTO 1121 - Ground-to-Air Television Demonstration -The quality of the Ground-
to-Air Television (GATV) Demonstration, both video and audio uplink, was 
excellent. Excerpts from the fifth game of the Major League World Series were 
uplinked to the crew. Principal Investigators were able to hold science briefings 
with the crew. Also, a GATV highlight was performing the first two-way 
conference in the Shuttle. 
DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES 
The results of the DSOs require a significant period of time to evaluate and 
present the results. Data were collected for all 12 DSOs, and these data have 
been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The release or publication of the 
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results is the responsibility of the sponsor. The DSOs performed on the STS-73 
mission were as follows: • 
1. DSO 487 - Immunological Assessment of Crewmembers (Preflight and 
Postflight only); 
2. DSO 491 -Characterization of Microbial Transfer Among 
Crewmembers (Preflight and Postflight only); 
3. DSO 603C- Orthostatic Function During Entry, Landing, and Egress; 
4. DSO 604-011 -Visual Vestibular Integration as a Function of 
Adaptation; 
5. DSO 604-013- Visual Vestibular Integration as a Function of 
Adaptation; 
6. DSO 611 -Air Monitoring Instrument Evaluation and Atmosphere 
Characterization; 
7. DSO 621 -In-Flight Use of Florinef to Improve Orthostatic Intolerance 
Postflight; 
8. DSO 802 - Educational Activities; 
9. DSO 901 - Documentary Television; 
10. DSO 902 - Documentary Motion Picture Photography; 
11. DSO 903 - Documentary Still Photography; and 
12. DSO 904- Assessment of Human Factors (Configuration C). 
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PHOTOGRAPHY AND TELEVISION ANALYSIS 
LAUNCH PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS 
A total of 24 videos of the launch were received and reviewed as planned. Also, 
thirty-three 16 mm films and nineteen 35 mm films were reviewed. No 
anomalous conditions were noted in the films or videos. 
ON-ORBIT PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS 
No on-orbit photography was reviewed except in support of DTO 312, and that 
review is discussed in a previous section of this report. 
LANDING PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS 
A total of 1 0 videos of the landing were reviewed, and all activities appeared to 
be nominal with no anomalies identified . 
43 
TABLE 1.- STS-73 MISSION EVENTS 
Event Description Actual time, G.m.t. • 
APU Activation APU-1 GG chamber pressure 293:13:48:11.561 
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 293:13:48:12.598 
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 293:13:48:13.567 
SRB HPU Activationa LH HPU System A start command 293:13:52:32.083 
LH HPU System B start command 293:13:52:32.243 
RH HPU System A start command 293:13:52.32.403 
RH HPU System B start command 293:13:52:32.563 
Main Propulsion System ME-3 Start command accepted 293:13:52:53.458 
Start6 ME-2 Start command accepted 293:13:52:53.577 
ME-1 Start command accepted 293:13:52:53.690 
SRB Ignition Command Calculated SRB ignition command 293:13:53:00.013 
(Lifto_ff) 
Throttle up to 1 04 Percent ME-3 Command accepted 293:13:53:03.878 
Thrust6 ME-2 Command accepted 293:13:53:03.878 
ME-1 Command accepted 293:13:53:03.890 
Throttle down to ME-3 Command accepted 293:13:53:32.198 
67 Percent Thrust6 ME-2 Command accepted 293:13:53:32.198 
ME-1 Command accepted 293:13:53:32.21 0 
Maximum Dynamic Pressure Derived ascent dynamic pressure 293:13:53:50 
(q) 
Throttle up to 1 04 Percent8 ME-3 Command accepted 293:13:54:00:519 
ME-2 Command accepted 293:13:54:00.519 
ME-1 Command accepted 293:13:54:00.531 
Both SRM's Chamber RH SRM chamber pressure 293:13:54:58.213 
Pressure at 50 psi8 mid-range select • LH SRM chamber pressure 293:13:54:58.733 
mid-range select 
End SRM a Actiona RH SRM chamber pressure 293:13:55:00.893 
mid-range select 
LH SRM chamber pressure 293:13:55:00.943 
mid-range select 
SRB Physical Separations LH rate APU turbine speed - LOS 293:13:55:03.613 
RH rate APU turbine SQ_eed - LOS 293:13:55:03.613 
SRB Separation Command SRB separation command flag 293:13:55:04 
Throttle Down for ME-3 command accepted 293:14:00:30.285 
3g Accelerations ME-2 command accepted 293:14:00:30.288 
ME-1 command accepted 293:14:00:30.297 
~Acceleration Total load factor 293:14:00:32.1 
Throttle Down to ME-3 command accepted 293:14:01:23.086 
67 Percent Thrust8 ME-2 command accepted 293:14:01:23.089 
ME-1 command accepted 293:14:01:23.098 
SSME Shutdown6 ME-3 command accepted 293:14:01:29.366 
ME-2 command accepted 293:14:01:29.369 
ME-1 command accepted 293:14:01:29.378 
MECO MECO command flag 293:14:01:30 
MECO confirm flag 293:14:01:30 
ET Separation ET separation command flag 293:14:01:49 
6 MSFC supplied data 
• 
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TABLE 1.- STS-73 MISSION EVENTS 
(Continued) 
Event Description Actual time, G.m.t. 
APU Deactivation APU-3 GG chamber pressure 293:14:07:08.688 
APU 1 GG chamber pressure 293:14:10:04.772 
APU 2 GG chamber pressure 293:14:10:21.785 
OM5-1 Ignition Left engine bi-prop valve position Not performed -
Right engine bi-prop valve position direct insertion 
trajectory flown 
OMS-1 Cutoff Left engine bi-prop valve position 
Right engine bi-prop valve _Q_osition 
OMS-2 Ignition Left engine bi-prop valve position 293:14:34:28.7 
Right engine bi-prop valve position 293:14:34:28.7 
OMS-2 Cutoff Right engine bi-prop valve position 293:14:36:27.6 
Left engine bi-prop valve position 293:14:36:27.6 
Payload Bay Doors (PLBDs) PLBD right open 1 293:15:27:14 
Open PLBD left open 1 293:15:28:36 
Flight Control System 
Checkout 
APU Start APU-3 GG chamber pressure 308:09:35:29.898 
APU Stop APU-3 GG chamber pressure 308:09:4 7.48.270 
Payload Bay Doors Close PLBD left close 1 309:08:11:19 
PLBD right close 1 309:08:13:59 
APU Activation for Entry APU-2 GG chamber pressure 309:10:41:57.690 
• 
APU-1 GG chamber pressure 309:11:00:31.206 
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 309:11 :00:33.169 
Deorbit Bum Ignition Left engine bi-prop valve position 309:10:46:40.1 
Right engine bi-prop valve position 309:10:46:40.1 
Deorbit Bum Cutoff Left engine bi-prop valve position 309:10:49:22.5 
Right er!Qine bi-prop valve position 309:10:49:22:6 
Entry_ Interface (400K feet) Current orbital altitude above 309:11:13:19 
Blackout end Data locked (high sample rate) No blackout 
Terminal Area Energy Mgmt. Major mode change (305) 309:11:39:09 
Main Landing Gear LH main landing gear tire pressure 1 309:11:45:21 
Contact RH main landing gear tire pressure 2 309:11:45:22 
Main Landing Gear LH main landing gear weight on 309:11:45:22 
Weight on Wheels wheels 
RH main landing gear weight on 309:11 :45:26 
wheels 
Drag Chute Deployment Drag chute deploy 1 CP Volts 309:11:45:29.2 
Nose Landing Gear NLG LH tire pressure 1 309:11:45:35 
Contact 
Nose Landing Gear NLG weight on wheels 1 309:11:45:36 
Weight On Wheels 
Drag Chute Jettison Drag chute jettison 1 CP Volts 309:11:45:58.1 
Wheel Sto,:>_ Velocity with respect to runway 309:11:46:17 
APU Deactivation APU-1 GG chamber pressure 309:12:04:05.174 
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 309:12:04:07.017 
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 309:12:04:07.928 
• 
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STS-73-V-03 
TABLE 11.- ORBITER PROBLEM TRACKING LIST 
Primary Thruster F1 F Failed Off 
of FES Feedline A Mid 2 
Heater System 1 
Level Ill Closure 
00:00:14 MET 
CAR 73RF02 
IPR 75V-0012 
293:16:54 G.m.t. 
00:03:01 MET 
CAR 75RF03 
IPR-75V-0006 
294:07:21 G.m.t. 
00:17:21 MET 
CAR 73RF04 
IPR 75V-0009 
rauea-on when fired during the RCS trim firing at 
approximately 00:03:01 G.m.t. The thruster chamber pressure reached only 
17 psia prior to the thruster being deselected by RM. F1 F injector 
temperature drops indicated that both propellant valves achieved at least 
pilot valve flow. The chamber pressure subsequently took about 15 minutes 
to return to zero psia. The fact that the chamber pressure decreased so 
slowly Indicates the fail-off was caused by a blockage of the PC tube orifice, 
rather than the typical oxidizer valve failure. This chamber pressure tube was 
flushed during the STS-73 flow. 
KSC: The chamber pressure tube was inspected for blockage and none 
was found. The thruster was removed and sent to WSTF for failure AnAiv~;i,; 
temperature slowly decreased during the first 
several days of the mission. When the temperature reached 54.7 °F at 
approximately 296:17:16 G.m.t. (03:03:23 MET), the FES feed-line A heaters 
were reconfigured from system 1 to system 2 and heater cycling was 
observed. From previous flight data, a heater-on cycle would have been 
expected on system 1 at approximately 70 oF • The system 1 heater was 
considered failed. All FES feed-line A heaters is considered failed. All FES 
feed-line A heaters cycled nominally on system 2. 
KSC: Postflight troubleshooting isolated the problem to a broken wire at a 
The wire was nmairAd 
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TABLE 11.- ORBITER PROBLEM TRACKING LIST 
I 
No. Title Time Comments i 
STS-73-V-05 Transient Thruster Command Path 300:18:04 G.m.t. Vernier RCS thrusters R5R and RSD failed to fire when commanded at 
Failure 07:04:11 MET 300:18:04 G.m.t. (07:04:11 MET). Chamber pressure (Pc) remained zero 
CAR 73RF05 and RM software deselected both thrusters. Data suggested a command 
IPR 75V-Q013 path problem. Because no indication of a thruster failure was present, both 
thrusters were hot-fired and each provided a good one-second pulse. The 
two vernier thrusters were then reselected for flight use. Note that a similar 
failure of thruster R5D occurred during the previous flight of this vehicle 
(STS-65), and troubleshooting failed to Indicate a cause. The MOM (S/N 
121) and the RJD (SIN 20) in the command path to the R5D and R5R vernier 
thrusters are the same units flown on STS-65. Several additional fail-offs of 
vernier thrusters R5D and R5R occurred, as well as a fail-off of primary 
thrusters L3D and R3D. The commands for the aft manifold 3 thrusters 
share the same MOM cards and channels as vernier thrusters R50 and R5R. 
KSC: Postflight troubleshooting was performed and the failure was not 
reproduced. The removed MOM was tested at the NSLD, and the failure was 
not repeated nor was any problem found. The RJD was also replaced. 
~ STS-73-V-06 S-band Lower Right Antenna 295:12:27 G.m.t. S-band forward link dropouts occurred while operating on the lower right Forward Link Dropouts 01:22:34 MET antenna. The dropouts have occurred when operating at the low and high 
IPR 75V-0011 frequencies and on both TORS satellites. The lower right antenna path Is 
suspect. On orbit troubleshooting was performed and it indicates a problem 
In the cabling to the lower right antenna. 
KSC: Postflight troubleshooting Intermittently reproduced the problem. 
The antenna was replaced, but testing Indicates dropouts still present. 
STS-73-V-07 CRT2 Fail 308:08:55 G.m.t. At 308:08:55 G.m.t. (14:19:02 MET), the crew reported that cathode ray tube 
14:19:02 MET (CRT) 2 was flashing on and off and that the symbols on the screen were 
CAR 73RF06 garbled. These symptoms were intermittent, and the data indicated a 
Level Ill Closure IPR 75V-0018 problem with the CRT. As a result, an IFM procedure to swap CRT 2 and 
CRT 4 was performed, and the CRT in position 2 performed satisfactorily for 
the remainder of the mission. The failed CRT was not repowered for the 
remainder of the mission. 
KSC: The CRT in position 4 was replaced, and the installation of the 
CRT in position 2 was verified. 
STS-73-V-Q8 H2 Manifold 1 Isolation Valve Failed 308:13:42 G.m.t. When the hydrogen and oxygen manifold isolation valves were being cycled 
Open. 14:23:49 MET for the in-flight checkout, the hydrogen manifold 1 isolation valve , which had 
CAR 73RF07 been open, failed to close when commanded at 308:13:42 G.m.t. 
(14:23:49 MET). Four minutes later, the switch was held in the close position 
for 10 seconds, but the valve position again did not change. Heater cycles 
confirmed that the valve was still open. This failure did not impact the 
mission. Postlanding, the valve cycled properly. 
KSC: Postflight troubleshooting was performed and the valve did 
operate. The valve panel was replaced. 
,l:l.. 
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TABLE 11.- ORBITER PROBLEM TRACKING LIST 
Title Time Comments 
APU 1 Fuel Pump Inlet Pressure 309:12:10 G.m.t. Postlanding, a decay was noted in the APU 1 fuel pump inlet pressure. The 
Decay Postlanding pressure dropped from 150 to 35 psia during a 20-minute period. The fuel 
pump seal cavity drain line pressure rose from 20.5 to 22.0 psia during the 
same period. Data review revealed that a slower decay was experienced 
during prelaunch operations, after the hot-fire of the APU, and following the 
on-orbit APU shut down. The signature may indicate leakage past the fuel 
pump seal in the seal cavity. 
KSC: A total of 1 OSee of liquid was present in the catch bottle. The APU 
was removed and replaced. 
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DOCUMENT SOURCES 
In an attempt to define the official as well as the unofficial sources of data for 
this mission report, the following list is provided. 
1. Flight Requirements Document 
2. Public Affairs Press Kit 
3. Customer Support Room Daily Reports 
4. MER Daily Reports 
5. MER Mission Summary Report 
6. MER Quick Look Report 
7. MER Problem Tracking List 
8. MER Event Times 
9. Subsystem Manager Reports/Inputs 
1 0. MOD Systems Anomaly List 
11. MSFC Flash Report 
12. MSFC Event Times 
13. MSFC Interim Report 
14. Crew Debriefing comments 
15. Shuttle Operational Data Book 
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations and their definitions as these items 
are used in this document. 
ABS 
AC/ac 
AIU 
AMCA 
APCF 
APU 
ARS 
ASC 
ATCS 
BITE 
Btu 
CB 
CEI 
CGBA 
CGF 
C02 
CPCG 
CPM 
CRIM 
CRT 
DOE 
DMHS 
DPM 
DSO 
DTO 
llV 
EPDC 
ET 
FA 
FCE 
FCL 
FCP 
FCS 
FCV 
FES 
FPA 
FSDC 
ft/sec 
GATV 
GBX 
GFE 
GFFC 
GH2 
ammonia boiler system 
alternating current 
audio interface unit 
aft motor control assembly 
Advance Protein Crystallization Facility 
auxiliary power unit 
atmospheric revitalization system 
Astroculture 
active thermal control system 
built-in test equipment 
British thermal unit 
circuit breaker 
contract end item 
Commercial Generic Bioprocessing Apparatus 
Crystal Growth Furnace 
carbon dioxide 
Commercial Protein Crystal Growth 
cell performance monitor 
commercial refrigeration/incubation module 
cathode ray tube 
Drop Dynamics Experiment 
dome-mounted heat shield 
Drop Physics Module 
Detailed Supplementary Objective 
Developmental Test Objective 
differential velocity 
electrical power distribution and control subsystem 
External Tank 
flight aft 
flight crew equipment 
Freon coolant loop 
fuel cell powerplant 
flight control system 
flow control valve 
flash evaporator system 
fluid processing apparatus 
fiber supported droplet combustion 
feet per second 
Ground-to-Air Television 
Glovebox 
Government furnished equipment 
Geophysical Fluid Flow Cell 
gaseous hydrogen 
B-1 
G.m.t. 
GPC 
GSE 
HI-PAC 
HPFTP 
HPOTP 
lCD 
IFM 
IR 
lsp 
I VIS 
JSC 
KCA 
KSC 
kW 
kWh 
Ibm 
LCC 
LH2 
LMES 
L02 
MADS 
Mbps 
MOM 
MEC 
MECO 
MET 
MLG 
MLGD 
MMCA 
MMD 
mmHg 
M/OD 
MPCA 
MPS 
MSFC 
mVdc 
NLG 
NASA 
nmi. 
NPSP 
NSTS 
OARE 
OMDP 
OMRSD 
OMS 
OPSTAT 
PAL 
Pc 
Greenwich mean time 
general purpose computer 
ground support equipment 
High-Packed Digital Television 
high pressure fuel turbopump 
high pressure oxidizer turbopump 
Interface Control Document 
in-flight maintenance (procedure) 
integrated receiver 
specific impulse 
Inertial Vibration Isolation System 
Johnson Space Center 
Ku-band communications adapter 
Kennedy Space Center 
kilowatt 
kilowatt/hour 
pound mass 
Launch Commit Criteria 
liquid hydrogen 
Lockheed Martin Engineering and Science 
liquid oxygen 
modular auxiliary data system 
Megabits per second 
multiplexer/demultiplexer 
master events controller 
main engine cutoff 
mission elapsed time 
main landing gear 
main landing gear door 
midbody motor controller assembly 
Microgravity Measuring Device 
millimeters of Mercury 
micrometeorite/orbital debris 
midpower controller assembly 
main propulsion system 
Marshall Space Flight Center 
millivolts direct current 
nose landing gear 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
nautical mile 
net positive suction pressure 
National Space Transportation System (i.e., Space Shuttle Program) 
Orbital Acceleration Research Experiment 
Orbiter maintenance down period 
Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications 
Document 
orbital maneuvering subsystem 
operational status 
protuberance air load 
chamber pressure 
B-2 
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• 
PCAM 
PDU 
PH-1 
PILOT 
PMBT 
ppm 
PRSD 
psi 
psi a 
psig 
RCRS 
RCS 
RJD 
RM 
RSD 
RSRM 
RSS 
RTV 
S&A 
SAMS 
SILTS 
SIP 
SLF 
SIN 
• 
SPCG 
SRB 
SRSS 
SSME 
STABLE 
STDCE 
STGT 
TB 
TORS 
TIPS 
TPS 
TV 
TVC 
USML-1 
USML-2 
Vdc 
WSB 
ZCG 
3-DMA 
• 
Protein Crystallization Apparatus for Microgravity 
power drive unit 
Phase 1 
Portable In-flight Landing Operations Trainer 
propellant mean bulk temperature 
parts per million 
power reactant storage and distribution 
pound per square inch 
pound per square inch absolute 
pound per square inch gravity 
Regenerative Carbon Dioxide Removal System 
reaction control subsystem 
reaction jet driver 
Redundancy Management 
Range Safety distributor 
Reusable Solid Rocket Motor 
Range Safety System 
room temperature vulcanizing (material) 
safe and arm 
Space Acceleration Measurement System 
Shuttle Infrared Leeside Temperature Sensing 
strain isolation pad 
Shuttle Landing Facility 
serial number 
Single-Locker Protein Crystal Growth 
Solid Rocket Booster 
Shuttle range safety system 
Space Shuttle main engine 
Suppression of Transient Accelerations by Levitation Evaluation 
Surface Tension Driven Convection Experiment 
Second TORS Ground Terminal 
thermal barrier 
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite 
Thermal Impulse Printer System 
thermal protection subsystem 
television 
television camera (color) 
United States Microgravity Laboratory-1 
United States Microgravity Laboratory-2 
Volts direct current 
water spray boiler 
Zeolite Crystal Growth 
Three Dimensional Microgravity Accelerometer 
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